Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

The State of Utah v. Ralph Leroy Menzies : Petition
for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Joan C. Watt, Brooke C. Wells, Richard G. Uday; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys
for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Menzies, No. 880161.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2104

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMENT
KFU

BRIEF

45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

%%o\y\
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Appellant/Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petition for rehearing of decision affirming convictions
and death sentence before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge,
presiding.

JOAN C. WATT
BROOKE C. WELLS
RICHARD G. UDAY
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

FILED
MAY 1 2 1994
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Appellant/Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petition for rehearing of decision affirming convictions
and death sentence before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge,
presiding.

JOAN C. WATT
BROOKE C. WELLS
RICHARD G. UDAY
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

IV

INTRODUCTION

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

2

OPINION

4

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS . .

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
DECISION TO CREATE A NEW REVERSIBILITY RULE FOR
ERRONEOUS DENIALS OF CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. . . . .
A. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
DECISION TO REJECT THE CRAWFORD RULE

5
6

1. This Court Has Followed the Crawford
Rule More Often and More Consistently
Than it Followed the Hopt Rule. . . . .

6

2. The Crawford Rule Represents a
Fairer Approach to Jury Selection and
Recognizes the Importance of Peremptory
Challenges and Challenges for Cause. . .

10

B. ASSUMING THIS COURT RETAINS ITS NEW RULE
REQUIRING PREJUDICE, IT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT
A DEFENDANT CAN ESTABLISH PREJUDICE BY
SHOWING THAT HE WOULD HAVE USED AN ADDITIONAL
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

12

1. A Majority of Jurisdictions Does Not
Reguire That a Biased Juror Sit in Order
to Preserve a Challenge for Cause. . . .

12

2. Prior Utah Case Law Applying the
"Hopt Rule" Did Not Reguire That a
Biased Juror Sit in Order to Preserve
a Challenge for Cause.

14

Page
C. THE NEW RULE FOR PRESERVING CHALLENGES
FOR CAUSE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO MENZIES'
CASE

17

1. The Procedure Introduced in Menzies
Creates a Procedural Bar Which Violates
Due Process.

18

2. The Newly Announced Procedure Is a
Clear Break With the Past and Therefore
Should Not Have Been Applied to Menzies.

22

D. MENZIES DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WAS
PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ERROR IN
DENYING HIS CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
1.

A Biased Jury Sat.

24
24

2. Jurors Against Whom Menzies Would
Have Used Additional Peremptory
Challenges Sat.

25

3. Menzies Argued in the Trial Court
and on Appeal That Death Qualification
Creates a Guilt Prone Jury.

26

POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
RESOLUTION OF APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE
ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION REQUIRES
A NEW TRIAL.

27

POINT III. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE
ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF MENZIES' ENTIRE PRISON
FILE IN LIGHT OF THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE
CONTENTS •

30

POINT IV. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE AND
OTHER UNADJUDICATED BAD ACTS IS NOT HARMLESS
ERROR.

31

POINT V. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
RESOLUTION OF MENZIES' CLAIM THAT APPLICATION
OF THE HEINOUSNESS AGGRAVATOR REQUIRES A NEW
PENALTY PHASE

33

ii

POINT VI. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
REFUSAL TO ADDRESS MENZIES' CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE IMPROPERLY RELIED ON THE PECUNIARY GAIN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
POINT VII. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
RESOLUTION OF MENZIES/ CLAIM THAT THE ADMISSION
OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY
HEARING.
POINT VIII. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS MENZIES'
CLAIM THAT THE PROSECUTORS ARGUMENT THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY
BECAUSE OTHERWISE MR. MENZIES MIGHT BE PAROLED
AND/OR ESCAPE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY HEARING. .
CONCLUSION

•• •
111

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Paai
CASES CITED
Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983)

22

Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990) . .

3S

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)

IS

Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)

1

Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328,
112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990)
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441,
108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990)

28, 29
37

Collier v. state, 705 P.2d 1126 (Nev. 1985)
Comm. v. Ingram, 591 A.2d 734 (Pa. Super. 1991)

39
....

Comm. v. Susi. 477 N.E.2d 995 (Mass. 1985)
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975)

12
12
2, 5, 6,
7, 9, 10,
12, 15, 17,
19, 22

Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1912)

1

Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1990)

13

Espinoza v. Florida,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 2926,

120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992)

36

Ferrell v. State. 475 P.2d 825 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) .

13

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 111 S.Ct. 850,
112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991)

19

Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) . . . .

22
1

Hopt v. Utah. 120 U.S. 430 (1887)

iv

Page
James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 104 S.Ct. 1830,
80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)

19, 20

Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992)

. .

Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1992) . . . .
Lee v. State, 743 P. 2d 296 (Wyo. 1987)

13, 16
31
13, 16

Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Board of
Equalizers, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982)
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 2222,
119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992)
NAACP v. Alabama ex re Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct.
1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)

23
20, 21, 22
19

Parsons v. Barnes, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994)

. .

3, 36

People v. Harris, 596 N.E.2d 1363 (111. App. 1992) . . .

13

People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d 119 (111. 1984)

39

People v. Hopt. 9 P. 407 (Utah 1886), aff'd., 120 U.S.
430 (1887)

5, 6, 7,
9, 15

People v. Johnson, 842 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1992)

13

Pickens v. State, 783 S.W.2d 341 (Ark. 1990)

13

Poet v. Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital, 445 N.W.2d
115 (Mich. 1989)
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273,
101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)
Sharp v. State, 837 P.2d 718 (Alaska App. 1992) . . . .
Sochor v. Florida, 540 U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 2114,
119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992)

v

13, 16
9, 12, 18,
19, 20, 21,
22
13, 16
36, 37

Paa
State v. Adcock, 310 S.E.2d 587 (N.C. 1983)

13,1

State v. Barnville, 445 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1983)

13, 1

State v. Bautista, 514 P.2d 530 (Utah 1973)

8, 9, 1!

State v. Bennett, 382 S.E.2d 322 (W.Va. 1989)

1!

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

1

State v. Blue Thunder, 466 N.W.2d 613 (S.C. 1991)

...

13, 1*

State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977)

1]

State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980)

3(

State v. Cano, 228 P. 563 (Utah 1924)
State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1994) . . .
State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)

8, IS
4, 37, 38
9

State v. Graham, 780 P.2d 1103 (Haw. 1989)

12

State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991)

22

State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989)

31

State v. Huerta, 855 P.2d 776 (Ariz. 1993)

10, 14

State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989)

28, 2£

State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993)

3]

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989)

28, 2<

State v. Jonas, 725 P. 2d 1378 (Utah 1986)

21

State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989)

i

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)
State v. Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1994) . . . .

vi

22, 31, 33
3
2

Page
State v. Mayberry, 807 P.2d 86 (Kan. 1991)

13

State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1994)

4, 5, 6,
7, 9, 11,
12, 15, 18,
22, 24, 27,
30, 31, 34,
35

State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992)'

34

State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992),
cert, granted, 113 S.Ct. 1840 (1993)

14

State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977)
State v. Noltie, 786 P.2d 332 (Wash. App. 1990)

11
....

13, 16

State v. Pelletier, 552 A.2d 805 (Conn. 1989)

13

State v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183 (Or. App. 1984)

14

State v. Poe, 471 P.2d 870 (Utah 1970)

8, 9, 15

State v. Ramos, 808 P.2d 1313 (Idaho 1991)

13

State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d 222 (Vt. 1992)

13, 14, 16,
17

State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 1989) . . . .
State v. Thome, 126 P. 286 (Utah 1912)
State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990)
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993)
Stringer v. Black, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367
(1992)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
, 113 S.Ct. 2078,
124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)
Thompson v. State, 721 P.2d 1290 (Nev. 1986)

vii

10
8, 9, 15
10, 12
4, 9, 14,
24, 26, 39
36
2, 29, 30
13, 16

Pag*
Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1990)

13, 1'

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579,
73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982)

22

United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659 (3rd Cir. 1993) . .

31

United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971)

3.1

.

21

VanDyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1991)
VanWaqoner v. Union Pacific Railroad, 186 P.2d 293
(Utah 1947)

7, 8, 9,
15

Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. 1990)

12

Victor v. Nebraska,

28

S.Ct.

(1994) (1994 WL 87447)

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844,
83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)
Williams v. Coinm., 415 S.E.2d 856 (Va. App. 1992)

...

20, 21, 22
12

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) (1953 as amended)

4, 37

Utah R. Crim. P. 18

21

Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d)

10

Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)

11

Amend. VI, U.S. Const

2, 18, 19,
23, 29, 30

Amend. VIII, U.S. Const

3, 4, 19,
23, 31, 33,
34, 35, 36,
37, 38

Amend. XIV, U.S. Const

18, 20, 33,
38

viii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appel1ee/Respondent,

:

v,

:

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

:

INTRODUCTION
Appellant/Petitioner, Ralph Leroy Menzies, files this
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

See Cumminqs v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1912)

(petition for rehearing is appropriate where the appellate court has
overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied relevant facts or law);
Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) (same).
Menzies continues to maintain that the issues raised in
Points I through XXXIV of his opening and reply briefs require that
his conviction be reversed and/or that a new penalty hearing be held
in his case.

In addition, Appellant/Petitioner Menzies maintains

that the issues raised in his briefs which this Court did not
address are meritorious and asks that this Court address all such
issues in its opinion regardless of whether Appellant has
specifically addressed the issue in this Petition for Rehearing.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Point I,

Challenge for Cause
This Court should grant rehearing on the challenges for

cause issue because (1) the reversibility rule of Crawford v.
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), is the "better" rule and has
been followed more often and more consistently by this Court than
the "Hopt rule"; (2) the majority of jurisdictions does not require
that a biased juror sit in order to establish bias; (3) the Crawford
rule was in effect at the time of Mr. Menzies' trial and applying
this new rule to Menzies violated due process, the Sixth Amendment,
equal protection and other constitutional provisions; and
(4) Menzies was prejudiced by the trial judge's erroneous failure to
grant his challenges for cause since two biased jurors challenged by
Menzies for cause sat on his jury, Menzies made a record of his
dissatisfaction with the seated jurors, and Menzies argued that
death qualification results in a guilt prone jury.

Point II.

Reasonable Doubt Instruction

The failure to adequately instruct the jury as to the
concept of reasonable doubt results in a due process and Sixth
Amendment violation.

Pursuant to Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), such an error is never
harmless because "there has been no jury verdict within the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment.11

- 2

-

Point III.

Prison File—Unreliable Reports

The double and triple hearsay reports in the prison file
created the same type of unreliable sentencing proceedings as that
which occurred in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah
1993) . This due process and Eighth Amendment violation requires a
new penalty hearing.

Point IV.

Admission of Prison File Not Harmless

The number and type of reports in the prison file preclude
its erroneous admission from being considered "harmless."

Point V.

Heinousness Aggravator
The record in this case demonstrates that the trial judge

relied on the heinousness aggravator.

He explicitly referred to

that aggravating factor and made an effort to ascertain the correct
subsection number when discussing it.

Reference to the subsection

by number would have been unnecessary and irrelevant if the judge
were not relying on the circumstance.

The ability of the trial

judge to consider the nature and circumstances of the crimes does
not remove the prejudicial impact of his reliance on an improper
factor in weighing circumstances.

Point VI.

Pecuniary Gain

This Court's recent decision in Parsons v. Barnes, 230 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 10-11 (Utah 1994), establishes that the trial judge
improperly relied on the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance.

- 3

-

This Court should address this issue in its opinion and hold that
the improper consideration of this factor alone, or in conjunction
with the improper heinousness aggravator, requires a new penalty
phase.

Point VII. Victim Impact
Menzies argued that the admission of victim impact evidence
violated the Eighth Amendment and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2).
This Court should reconsider its resolution of this issue in light
of its decision in State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 32-33
(Utah 1994).

Point VIII.

Prosecutor Argument

This Court should address Appellant's claims that the
prosecutor's argument that Menzies should be given the death penalty
because otherwise he might escape or be paroled was improper.

The

emotional impact of this type of argument and the frequency with
which it is apparently made in capital cases in Utah (see State v.
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 421 fn.4 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., concurring
and dissenting)) demonstrate the prejudicial effect of such an
argument and suggest that guidance is needed from this Court.

OPINION
On March 29, 1994, this Court issued its Opinion in
State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1994) (Case No. 880161).
A copy of the Opinion is contained in Appendix A.

- 4
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TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions is contained in Appendix B:
Rule 18(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Eighth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
DECISION TO CREATE A NEW REVERSIBILITY RULE FOR
ERRONEOUS DENIALS OF CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE.
In State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 1994),
this Court overruled the reversibility rule applicable to trial
judge errors in denying challenges for cause which had been set
forth in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), and its
progeny, and created a new rule requiring a defendant to
"demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was
partial or incompetent."

Id. at 24.

Mr. Menzies requests that this Court reconsider the
resolution of his challenges for cause issue as follows:
(1) Appellant requests that this Court reconsider its decision to
reject the Crawford rule because this Court has followed the
Crawford rule more often and more consistently than the rule
articulated in People v. Hopt, 9 P. 407 (Utah 1886), aff'd., 120
U.S. 430, 442 (1887); (2) assuming this Court continues to reject
the Crawford rule, Mr. Menzies requests that this Court clarify that

- 5

-

a defendant can establish prejudice by demonstrating that s/he would
have used an additional peremptory challenge; (3) Mr. Menzies
requests that this Court reconsider applying the newly articulated
rule to his case since his lawyers followed the Crawford rule which
was in effect at the time of trial; and (4) Mr. Menzies requests
that this Court reconsider its determination that he was not
prejudiced since two biased jurors challenged by Menzies for cause
sat on the jury, Menzies made a record of his dissatisfaction with
the jury which was seated, and Mr. Menzies argued that death
qualification results in a guilt prone jury.

A. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DECISION TO
REJECT THE CRAWFORD RULE.
1. This Court Has Followed the Crawford Rule
More Often and More Consistently Than It Followed
the Hopt Rule.
This Court resurrected the 1886 territorial decision in
People v. Hoptf 9 P. 407 (Utah 1886), as the historical basis for
its change in procedure, pointing out that in Hopt/ the Court stated:
[A] perfect answer to the point raised is that of
the three jurors challenged two were not sworn.
One was challenged peremptorily by the defendant,
and one by the people. Whether, therefore, the
challenges were properly denied or not, they did
not sit as jurors; the defendant was not
prejudiced by the ruling.
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25.

The Hopt Court provided no

analysis supporting this alternative basis for affirming the death
sentence.

In addition, the Hopt Court pointed out that it was "of

the opinion that the jurors were competentfff and that

- 6
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fl

[t]he

opinions they had formed were not such as would disqualify them
under our statutes."

Hopt, 9 P. at 407 (emphasis added).

In other

words, the trial judge did not err in Hopt in denying the challenges
for cause.

In addition, the defendant did not make specific

challenges as required and the court therefore was unable to review
them.

Hopt, 9 P. at 408.

Given the fact that no error occurred in

denying challenges for cause in Hopt, the discussion in Hopt as to
the standard for reversal was unnecessary.
Any persuasive force of Hopt is further undermined by the
fact that the defendant did not use three of his peremptory
challenges.

In other words, Hopt did not sacrifice a peremptory

challenge in order to remove the challenged jurors.1

Hence, the

dicta from Hopt quoted in Merizies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25,
provides little support for overruling the modern day Crawford rule.
Following the Hopt decision in 1886, this Court articulated
the Hopt reversibility rule only five times before embracing the
automatic reversibility rule 89 years later in Crawford v. Manning,
542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975).

See VanWagoner v. Union Pacific

1. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the issue
in Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436 (1887), and determined that
reversal was not required because:
The challenges for implied bias fell, as there
was no specification of the grounds for such
challenges, as required by § 242 of the Act of
1878.
Hopt at 436. In addition, the Court pointed out that the defendant
had not used all of his peremptory challenges.

- 7
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Railroad, 186 P.2d 293, 298-99 (Utah 1947); State v. Cano2, 228 P.
563, 568 (Utah 1924); State v, Thorne3, 126 P. 286, 291 (Utah 1912);
State v, Poe4, 471 P.2d 870 (Utah 1970); State v. Bautista5, 514
P.2d 530 (Utah 1973).
Only Thorne made any attempt to analyze the basis of the
rule.

The Thorne Court explained that although none of the

challenges for cause should have been granted, the failure to
challenge the final juror precluded reversal.

The procedure for

seating a juror when Thorne was tried required that parties
challenge a juror immediately after he was voir dired.

The

defendant used his final challenge during the seating of Juror 11
and did not make a record regarding the unacceptability of
Juror 12. Relying on the procedure for seating a jury, the Thorne
Court reasoned that "[i]f appellant had any personal or other
objection to the juror, he should have indicated it then and
there."

126 P. at 292.
In VanWagoner, with little analysis, the Court reaffirmed

2.

In Cano, the defendant did not use all of his peremptories.

3. In Thorne, the defendant did not have grounds for a challenge
for cause.
4. In Poe, 471 P.2d at 871, the court indicated that the trial
judge had been "meticulous" in striking biased jurors.
5. In Bautista, 514 P.2d at 532, the court did not address whether
the juror should have been removed for cause. Instead, the court
resolved the issue by stating, "[n]o claim is made by the defendants
that by reason of the court's failure to excuse the prospective
juror they had challenged they were compelled to use the peremptory
challenge they might have used to strike another prospective juror's
name from the list."

- 8

Thorne even though the procedure for picking a jury had changed.6
By contrast to the Hopt line of cases, this Court and the
Court of Appeals followed the Crawford reversibility rule over 25
times in the 19-year period from when the rule was implemented until
it was overruled in the instant case.

Indeed, this Court reaffirmed

the rule despite the fact that the State made a Ross challenge
similar to that in the instant case.

See, e.g., State v. Gotschall,

782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah
1989); State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 343, 395-6.

Furthermore, in

Young, a capital case tried after the instant case and decided while
Menzies was on direct appeal, this Court applied the Crawford
reversibility rule and afforded Mr. Young a new trial based in part
on the trial judge's failure to grant one of Young's challenges for
cause.7
Hence, a review of Utah case law regarding challenges for
cause reveals that Crawford and its progeny are on firmer ground and
have been applied more consistently than the short Hopt line of
cases.

6. VanWagoner and Bautista appear to be the only two cases of the
six where the Court arguably may have been persuaded that the
defendant had a good challenge for cause. Although the Court did
not state directly that the challenge should have been granted, it
did not state that the juror was "competent11 or without bias as it
stated in Hopt, Thorne and Poe.
7. Allowing Mr. Young to benefit from the Crawford rule and obtain
a new trial while not allowing Mr. Menzies the same treatment
violates Menzies' right to equal protection and due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

- 9

2. The Crawford Rule Represents a Fairer
Approach to Jury Selection and Recognizes the
Importance of Peremptory Challenges and
Challenges for Cause.
As Menzies pointed out in his reply brief, the Crawford
rule protects important rights.
old credentials7" and is

fl/

very

fl,

secured to the accused.'"
1993).

The peremptory challenge has

one of the most important of rights
State v. Huerta, 855 P.2d 776, 779 (Ariz.

Various courts have recognized that requiring a defendant to

show prejudice in order to preserve a challenge for cause would
severely undermine the value of peremptory and for cause
challenges.

See State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 1989);

State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990); State v. Bennett, 382
S.E.2d 322 (W.Va. 1989).
In Sexton, the court pointed out that "adoption of such a
harmless error test would inevitably lead to bizarre results" and
create a "Hobson's choice" for a defendant faced with a juror who
should be stricken for cause.

In Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d at 193, the

court recognized that applying a harmless error test to erroneous
denials of challenges for cause "would severely dilute the value of
the peremptory challenges."

And the Huerta Court concluded:

Requiring a party to show separate prejudice when
a trial judge erroneously fails to remove a
biased juror would effectively eviscerate the
right to peremptory challenges []. The prejudice
of having one less peremptory challenge than the
other side is enough to mandate reversal.
Huerta, 855 P.2d at 781.
Rule 18(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
each party is entitled to ten peremptory challenges in a capital
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case; Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
challenges for cause.

In State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah

1977), this Court explained that requiring the defendant to use a
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed
for cause violated the statutory scheme which provided for both such
types of challenges.

See also State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802

(Utah 1977) (explaining that a defendant is entitled to use all of
his peremptory challenges provided by statute, and that where a
defendant is forced to use peremptory challenges on jurors who
should have been removed for cause, the defendant is deprived of
some of his statutorily mandated peremptory challenges).
Candor in the law and a criminal defendant's right to due
process and a fair jury trial is best served by requiring trial
judges to remove biased jurors who are challenged for cause and to
err on the side of removing questionable jurors rather than allowing
them to remain on the panel, as seems to be the current practice.
See Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.

By changing the rule to

require prejudice, this Court essentially gives a message to trial
judges that they can deny valid challenges for cause without
impunity.
In the present case, Menzies was deprived of five of the
peremptory challenges to which he was entitled under Rule 18. By
contrast, the State was able to exercise five more peremptory
challenges than Menzies.

Depriving Menzies of these challenges

violated his right to due process and a fair jury trial.
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B. ASSUMING THIS COURT RETAINS ITS NEW RULE
REQUIRING PREJUDICE, IT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT A
DEFENDANT CAN ESTABLISH PREJUDICE BY SHOWING THAT
HE WOULD HAVE USED AN ADDITIONAL PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE.
1. A Majority of Jurisdictions Does Not Require
That a Biased Juror Sit in Order to Preserve a
Challenge for Cause.
Both this Court and the State claim that a majority of the
states require prejudice.

State's brief at 47-9; State v. Menzies#

235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24.

In Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d at 193, the Court

questioned the State's claim in that case that a majority of
jurisdictions embraced the prejudice requirement.

A review of the

cases cited by the State for its majority argument establishes that
some of those cases actually follow a rule similar to the Crawford
rule; e.g., Williams v. Comm., 415 S.E.2d 856, 860 (Va. App. 1992)
(a trial court erred in not excluding jurors for cause "and the
error was not cured by the fact that three of the four were struck
by counsel"); Comm. v. Susi, 477 N.E.2d 995 (Mass. 1985) ("erroneous
denial of the right to exercise a proper peremptory challenge is
reversible error without a showing of prejudice.").
Others do not clearly support the State's position.

See

Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ind. 1990) (defendant had not
used all of his peremptory challenges so no reversible error);
State v. Graham, 780 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Haw. 1989) (Court determines
challenged juror not biased; footnote points out that juror did not
sit and cites Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101
L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), without discussion); Comm. v. Ingram, 591 A.2d
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734 (Pa. Super. 1991) (same); State v. Mayberry, 807 P.2d 86, 98
(Kan. 1991) (jurors not biased and defendant did not use peremptory
challenges on them; they sat on jury); Sharp v. State, 837 P.2d 718,
727 (Alaska App. 1992) (defendant failed to use all of his
peremptories); People v. Johnson, 842 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1992) (defendant
did not exhaust peremptories and expressed no dissatisfaction with
jury).
In addition, the majority of the cases cited by the State
which require prejudice, require only that the defendant make a
showing that he would have used an additional peremptory challenge
and not that an impartial juror actually sat.

See, e.g., Poet v.

Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital, 445 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Mich.
1989); State v. Noltie. 786 P.2d 332, 335 (Wash. App. 1990);
State v. Barnville, 445 A.2d 298, 301 (R.I. 1983); Lee v. State, 743
P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d 222, 224 (Vt.
1992); Trotter v. State. 576 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1990); Thompson v.
State, 721 P.2d 1290 (Nev. 1986); State v. Adcock, 310 S.E.2d 587,
594 (N.C. 1983); State v. Blue Thunder, 466 N.W.2d 613, 620 (S.C.
1991); Jones v. State. 833 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992).
Indeed, only eight jurisdictions cited by the State appear
to require that an impartial juror actually sit in order to preserve
an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause.

Pickens v. State, 783

S.W.2d 341, 345 (Ark. 1990); State v. Pelletier. 552 A.2d 805 (Conn.
1989); Dawson v. State. 581 A.2d 1078, 1094 (Del. 1990); State v.
Ramos, 808 P.2d 1313 (Idaho 1991); People v. Harris. 596 N.E.2d
1363, 1365-66 (111. App. 1992); Ferrell v. State. 475 P.2d 825, 828
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(Okla. Crim. App. 1970); State v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or.
App. 1984); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 329 (Tenn. 1992),
cert, granted, 113 S.Ct. 1840 (1993).
Hence, a majority of jurisdictions does not require that a
biased juror sit in order to preserve the erroneous denial of a
challenge for cause.

Instead, the majority of jurisdictions

requires no showing of prejudice or that the defendant show s/he
would have used an additional peremptory challenge.

Utah should not

join the small group of jurisdictions which require that a biased
juror sit in order to preserve a challenge for cause.

To do so

"would effectively eviscerate the right to peremptory challenges" as
well as the important role played by challenges for cause in the
jury selection process.

See Huerta, 855 P.2d at 781; Santelli, 621

A.2d at 224-5.

2. Prior Utah Case Law Applying the "Hopt Rule"
Did Not Require That a Biased Juror Sit in Order
to Preserve a Challenge for Cause.
This Court concluded that:
even if the trial court erred in failing to
remove those prospective jurors whom Menzies
found objectionable, that error was harmless.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Menzies has not
asserted that he faced a partial or biased jury
during the guilt phase of his trial or that the
jury was made more likely to convict as a result
of "death qualifying" the jury. Cf. State v.
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 342, 386-95, 414-17 (Utah
1993). Furthermore, while the bulk of Menzies'
objections to potential jurors revolved around
those individuals' views on the death penalty,
the penalty phase was tried to the court rather
than to the jury.
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nzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.
The precise standard for reversal or the type of record
quired to show that the error was not harmless is not clear from
as passage.

A review of pre-Crawford case law suggests that under

le Hopt line of cases, a defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous
mial of a challenge for cause, not only when a juror who should
ive been removed for cause sat, but also when a defendant indicated
lat he had a "personal objection" to or would have used a
eremptory challenge on one of the sitting jurors.

See, e.g.,

anWagoner, 186 P.2d at 297 (stating that to show prejudice,
efendant must show that "an objectionable juror was forced upon him
fter his peremptory challenges were exhausted, and whom he would
ave removed from the panel by challenging him peremptorily if his
thallenges had not been exhausted); Thorne, 126 P. at 291 (same);8
Jautista, 514 P.2d at 532 ("[n]o claim was made by the defendants
:hat by reason of the court's failure to excuse the prospective
juror they had challenged they were compelled to use the peremptory
challenge they might have used to strike another prospective juror's
name from the list").
As previously outlined, many jurisdictions require only
that a defendant make a showing that he was dissatisfied with the
jury or would have used a peremptory challenge on a sitting juror.

8. In Cano, 228 P. at 568, the defendant did not use all his
peremptory challenges and all objectionable jurors were removed. In
Poe, 471 P.2d at 870, the court determined that the trial judge did
not err in refusing to strike jurors for cause. The Poe court did
not address the prejudice standard.
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See State v. Barnvillef 445 A.2d at 301 (to show prejudice,
defendant must exhaust peremptories and "bring to the attention of
the trial justice that he is unsatisfied with the makeup of the
jury"); State v. Adcockf 310 S.E.2d at 594 (to show prejudice,
defendant "must (1) exhaust his peremptory challenges and
(2) thereafter assert his right to challenge peremptorily an
additional juror.

[citation omitted]"; Poet v. Traverse City

Osteopathic Hospital, 445 N.W.2d at 121 (to show prejudice,
"aggrieved party" must exhaust all peremptories and "demonstrate the
desire to excuse another objectionable juror"); Sharp v. State, 837
P.2d at 723 (for reversal, defendant must show "that he has
exhausted his peremptory challenges and . . . " an objectionable
juror sat); Thompson v. State, 721 P.2d at 1291 (defendant must
demonstrate "that any other jurors proved unacceptable or would have
been excused had an additional peremptory challenge been available);
State v. Blue Thunder, 466 N.W.2d at 620 (for reversal, defendant
must use all of peremptory challenges and show that he would have
used another peremptory); State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d at 224
(reversible "error to 'force a defendant to use his last peremptory
challenge to exclude a juror challengeable for cause); State v.
Noltie, 786 P.2d at 335 (suggesting that a request for an additional
peremptory challenge establishes prejudice); Lee v. State, 743 P.2d
at 298 (to show prejudice, juror must exhaust peremptories and
designate sitting juror against whom he would have used a peremptory
challenge); Jones v. Statey 833 S.W.2d at 123 (reversible error
where defendant is refused additional peremptory challenges and
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ror sat against whom defendant would have used a peremptory
Lallenge); Trotter v, State, 576 So.2d at 692 (juror whom defendant
>uld have stricken peremptorily must sit).
In Santelli, the Court declined to require a defendant to
low actual prejudice, pointing out that such a rule would make
rroneous denials of challenges for cause unreviewable.
If we were to accept the actual prejudice rule,
the trial court's errors would become
unreviewable because the focus of the appellate
inquiry would not be on the court's error, but on
the qualifications of the juror subject to the
lost peremptory challenge.
21 A.2d at 224-5.
The majority of jurisdictions does not require that a
)iased juror sit in order to preserve a challenge for cause. A
lumber of jurisdictions recognizes that challenges for cause will
lave no continuing viability if such a requirement is imposed.
4r. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court clarify that a
defendant can establish prejudice by exhausting his peremptories,
requesting an additional peremptory which is refused, and making a
record that he would have used an additional peremptory challenge if
allowed.

C. THE NEW RULE FOR PRESERVING CHALLENGES FOR
CAUSE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO MENZIES' CASE.
At the time of Appellant's trial, use of a peremptory
challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause
required reversal.

See Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091; State v.
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Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988).

Appellant preserved his

challenges for cause as required by then existing procedural rules.

1. The Procedure Introduced in Menzies Creates a
Procedural Bar Which Violates Due Process.
In June 1988, after the trial in the present case, the
United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ross v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).

For almost six

years following the opinion in Ross, Utah has maintained its
automatic reversibility rule.
In Ross, the Court held that Oklahoma's firmly entrenched
procedural rule which required that a defendant use all of his
peremptory challenges and that the biased juror actually sit did not
violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.

The Court did not

decide the broader question whether, in the absence of Oklahoma's
limitation on the "right" to exercise peremptory challenges, "a
denial or impairment" of the exercise of peremptory challenges
occurs if the defendant uses one or more challenges to remove jurors
who should have been excused for cause."
at 91 n.4.

Ross v. Oklahomaf 487 U.S.

Ross is therefore not controlling in this case where no

procedure similar to that in Oklahoma exists.

Because the Utah

reversibility rule in effect at the time of the Menzies trial
required that a defendant use a peremptory challenge to remove a
for cause juror, this Court answered an even broader question than
the one left open in Ross.
In Menzies, this Court decided the unresolved question in
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ss, but went a step further since not only did the Oklahoma
versibility rule not exist in Utah at the time of Menzies' trial,
it a distinct rule did exist.
)91 and its progeny.

See Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d

By applying a new rule which creates a

rocedural bar to substantive review of this issue, this Court
Lolated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, due process and equal
rotection.

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112

.Ed.2d 935 (1991).
In Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, the United States Supreme
ourt held that applying Georgia's newly enacted contemporaneous
bjection rule for preserving claims under Batson v. Kentucky to a
iefendant whose case was tried before enactment of the rule violated
lue process.

In reaching its decision, the Court relied on its

>rior case law which established that a state procedural rule which
lad not been announced at the time of trial could not be used to bar
review of federal constitutional issues.

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S.

it 423-4, citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
457-458, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) ("Novelty in
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this
Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior
decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal
constitutional rights.11); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 104 S.Ct.
1830, 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984) (holding that "only a 'firmly
established and regularly followed state practice' may be interposed
by a state to prevent subsequent review by this Court of a federal
constitutional claim").
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The Court stated:
To apply [the rule] retroactively to bar
consideration of a claim . . . would therefore
apply a new rule unannounced at the time of
petitioner's trial and consequently inadequate to
serve as an independent state ground with the
meaning of James.
498 U.S. at 424.
Failure to remove a juror for cause is constitutional erro:
pursuant to Ross v. Oklahoma, 101 L.Ed.2d at 80; Morgan v. Illinois
504 U.S.

, 112 S.Ct.

, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); and

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841
(1985) ; among others.
In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.

, 112 S.Ct.

, 119

L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the Court held that a trial court violates due
process where it refuses to ask jurors whether they would
automatically impose death.

The Court reached that decision based

on its prior decisions which established that "based on the
requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for
cause any prospective juror who maintains [that he or she will
automatically impose death].11
In Morgan, the Court relied on its prior decisions which
established that failure to remove a juror for cause was
constitutional error.

The Court stated:

[I]t is clear from Witt and Adams, the progeny of
Witherspoon, that a juror who in no case would
vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or
her instructions, is not an impartial juror and
must be removed for cause.
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mphasis added)•
The Morgan Court also pointed out that "in the course of
caching" its decision in Ross v. Oklahoma,
We announced our considered view that because the
Constitution guarantees a defendant on trial for
his life the right to an impartial jury, 487
U.S., at 85, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 108 S.Ct. 2273, the
trial court's failure to remove the juror for
cause was constitutional error under the standard
enunciated in Witt.
19 L.Ed.2d at 502.
Because due process requires that criminal defendants be
ble to challenge jurors for cause, it necessarily follows that a
ue process violation occurs where the trial judge refuses to remove
tuch jurors for cause.

See Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502 (court

:ommitted error under Wainwright v. Witt).
In addition, requiring a defendant to use his peremptory
challenges to remove for cause a juror where no statutory limitation
on the right to exercise peremptories exists constitutes a further
due process violation.

Pursuant to Rule 18, Utah Rule of Criminal

Procedure, Menzies was entitled to exercise ten peremptory
challenges with additional challenges for alternate jurors.

Menzies

was able to exercise fewer than the rule mandated number of
peremptory challenges, thereby violating his right to due process.
Furthermore, the State was able to exercise all of its rule mandated
peremptory challenges on impartial jurors, creating an imbalance in
the use of rule mandated peremptory challenges.
In this case, this Court announced a new rule six years
after trial which acts as a procedural bar to review of Menzies'
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claim that constitutional error under Witt# Morgan, Ross, and other
cases occurred in this case.

In so doing, this Court violated due

process and other federal constitutional protections.

2. The Newly Announced Procedure Is a Clear
Break With the Past and Therefore Should Not Have
Been Applied to Menzies.
The procedure announced in Menzies changes the previous
procedure for preserving challenges for cause and overrules this
Court's prior decisions in Crawford v. Manning and its progeny.
This "abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an
entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one" is a "clear
break with the past."

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102

S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119,
1123 (Utah 1991).

A new rule of criminal procedure which

constitutes a "clear break with the past" is usually not
retroactively applied.

Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1123.

See generally

Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) (refusing to give
retroactive application to Wood standard); State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239, 1259-61 (Utah 1988) (applying prospectively the new
requirement that state can establish unproven criminal conduct by
proving such conduct in the penalty phase); State v. Jonasf 725 P.2d
1378, 1380 (Utah 1986) (refusing to give retroactive application to
new rule regarding cautionary eyewitness identification
instructions).
This Court has recognized in civil cases that a change in
the law will not be applied retroactively when a substantial
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[justice would result or when there has been justifiable reliance
i the prior rule.

Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah

>92); VanDyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1991); Loyal
rder of Moose No. 259 v. County Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d
57, 264-5 (Utah 1982).
In VanDyke, 818 P.2d at 1025, the Court stated:
However, the modern view is that the retroactive
operation of a change in common law is not
invariable and is not a question of judicial
power; rather, whether a decision will operate
prospectively should depend solely upon an
appraisal of the relevant judicial policies to be
advanced. In making this determination, we look
to the impact retroactive application would have
on those affected. When we conclude there had
been justifiable reliance on the prior state law
or that the retroactive operation of the new law
may otherwise create undue burden, the court may
order that a decision apply only prospectively.
(emphasis added).
At trial in the present case, defense counsel followed the
veil-established rule for preserving challenges for cause.

She

justifiably relied on the existing rule in deciding how to exercise
her challenges.9

Imposing a new rule on defendant which counsel had

no way of anticipating creates an undue and unfair burden.

Due

process, equal protection, the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth
Amendment are violated by this Court's application of a new rule for
preserving challenges for cause.

9. In State v. Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1994), slip op. at
9 fn.2, this Court recognized that until a rule of law is changed, a
criminal defendant has no reason to advance a new and different
argument. Defense counsel reasonably followed existing procedure
for preserving challenges for cause.
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D. MENZIES DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED
BY THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ERROR IN DENYING HIS
CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE.
In Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26, this Court stated:
Menzies has not asserted that he faced a partial
or biased jury during the guilt phase of his
trial or that the jury was more likely to convict
as a result of "death qualifying" the jury.
This determination that Menzies has not shown prejudice is incorrect
for three reasons:

(1) biased jurors sat on the jury, including two

jurors who had been unsuccessfully challenged for cause; (2) Menzies
made a record regarding his dissatisfaction with the jury that was
seated after he was forced to use his peremptory challenges on
jurors who should have been removed for cause; and (3) Menzies did
argue that death qualification made a jury more guilt prone, and
asked this Court to remand the case in light of this Court's
decision in State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 386-95, 414-17, 418, so that
he could provide the court with additional evidence in support of
his argument.

Appellant's opening brief at 195-67; reply brief at

71.

1.

A Biased Jury Sat.

Menzies challenged Juror Kathy Rosenkrantz for cause based
on her answers indicating "she would consider voting for the death
penalty in order to ensure no release from prison ever occurred."
R. 872; see Juror Rosenkrantz voir dire at T. 860-73 contained in
Appendix C.

R. 871-2.

The trial judge denied the challenge, and

Juror Rosenkrantz sat on the jury.

R. 872-3.
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Defense counsel

irified that she was not waiving the challenge against Rosenkrantz
*n though she had not used a peremptory challenge on Rosenkrantz.
3 pointed out that "given the entire pool that we had before us,
was our decision that perhaps there are others that we should
ke off given their order and the entire situation."

R. 891-2; see

anscript in Appendix D.
Menzies also challenged Sandra Stroud, who ultimately sat
the jury, for cause.

T. 269-70. The basis of the challenge was

e juror's long and close associations with police officers.
269-70; see Appendix E.

The officers with whom she had a close

lationship included her father-in-law, her best friend, a
eutenant in the Murray City Police, and a brother-in-law.
482-4.

2. Jurors Against Whom Menzies Would Have Used
Additional Peremptory Challenges Sat.
Menzies indicated on the record that he exercised his
eremptories as he did based on the pool of jurors available, and
hat he did not waive his for cause challenges to jurors who sat.
efense counsel's statement as a whole indicates that Menzies would
ave used additional peremptories had they been available and
ixpressed dissatisfaction with the jury which was seated.

T. 891-2;

>ee transcript in Appendix D.
Menzies would have used additional peremptory challenges on
rurors Stroud and Rosenkrantz, the jurors whom Menzies had
msuccessfully challenged for cause.

In addition, a peremptory
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would have been used on Lillian Eaton, the juror who fainted during
the medical examiner's testimony among others (R. 1621-2).

Juror

Eaton had heard about the case and repeatedly stated that death was
the appropriate penalty for premeditated murder.

T. 843-7.

This dissatisfaction with the jury which was seated is
further emphasized by the fact that Menzies waived his right to a
jury for sentencing after the jury convicted him of capital
homicide.

Had Menzies intended to have the trial judge decide his

sentence, death qualification of the jury, which Menzies challenged
(R. 274-95), would have been unnecessary.

The timing of the waiver

coupled with Menzies' expressed dissatisfaction with the jury
establishes the prejudice caused by the trial judge's erroneous
denials of challenges for cause.

3. Menzies Argued in the Trial Court and on
Appeal That Death Qualification Creates a Guilt
Prone Jury.
Menzies filed a pretrial motion to preclude death
qualification and supporting memorandum.

R. 274-5, 276-95.

On

appeal, he renewed his argument, pointing out that death
qualification results in conviction prone juries (Appellant's
opening brief at 195-6).

Menzies cited various cases in support of

this proposition, included his trial motion and memorandum (see
Addendum 0 to Appellant's opening brief), and referred this Court to
the briefs in the David Young case for further discussion.
In his reply brief, filed after this Court issued its
decision in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, Menzies renewed his claim
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d asked this Court to remand the case for a hearing in which
rther evidence regarding the procedure and its impact on a
fendant's right to a fair trial would be introduced.

Appellants

ply Brief at 71.
Hencef Menzies did claim that the death qualification
rocess resulted in a more conviction prone jury.

This Court

acorrectly resolved Menzies' challenge for cause claims by relying
n part on Menzies' failure to argue that death qualification
reates a more guilt prone jury.

This Court incorrectly stated:

Menzies has not asserted that he faced a partial
or biased jury during the guilt phase of his
trial or that the jury was made more likely to
convict as a result of "death qualifying" the
Oury.
lenzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.
Menzies was prejudiced in this case where biased jurors
sat, he made a record of his dissatisfaction with the jury that was
seated, and he argued that death qualification created a guilt prone
jury.

Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court reconsider

its determination that he was not prejudiced by the trial judge's
erroneous denials of his challenges for cause.

POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
RESOLUTION OF APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE
ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A
NEW TRIAL.
The trial judge erroneously instructed the jury regarding
the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

R. 857.

Instruction No. 12, a copy of which is contained in Appendix F,
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contains language which fails to properly define proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.

For example, the instruction informed the jury

that "[pjroof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it."

The language was

disapproved as misstating the law by a majority of this Court in
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1148 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).

The instruction also contains the "abiding conviction"

and "weighty affairs" language disapproved in Johnson and State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Instruction No. 12 as a whole fails to adequately define proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and resembles the unconstitutional "moral
certainty" and "grave uncertainty" language in the unconstitutional
Louisiana instruction.

See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111

S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990).

The problems with this

instruction are greater than those in Victor v. Nebraska,
S.Ct.

(1994) (1994 WL 87447), and fail to define reasonable

doubt.
In his dissent in the present case, Justice Stewart
recognized that the reasonable doubt instruction was erroneous.

The

majority of this Court determined that its decisions in Ireland and
Johnson were "made in exercise of this Court's supervisory powers
over lower courts" and therefore were not retroactive and did not
apply to the present case.

Appellant respectfully requests that

this Court reconsider its decision regarding the erroneous
reasonable doubt instruction in light of the United States Supreme
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urt decision in Cage and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

, 113

Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).
In Cage, the Court held that due process is violated where
e concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not adequately
ifined for the jury.

Pursuant to Cage# erroneous reasonable doubt

istructions result in a constitutional violation.

Regardless of

lether this Court used its supervisory powers in Johnson and
reland, the failure to properly guide the jury in this case amounts
D a due process and Sixth Amendment violation.
The failure to adequately instruct the jury on reasonable
oubt violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial
ury as well as due process.
13 S.Ct.

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).

,

Justice Scalia, writing for

unanimous Court, pointed out that the right to an impartial jury
ncludes "as its most important element," the right to have a jury
letermine guilt, and that this right is interrelated with the due
process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hence, "the

jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

Sullivan, 124 L.Ed.2d at 188.

In reaching its decision in Sullivan that the failure to
properly instruct the jury on proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
never harmless error, the Court reasoned that in the absence of a
proper reasonable doubt instruction, "there has been no jury verdict
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment."
(emphasis added).

124 L.Ed.2d at 189

Even if an appellate court were to conclude "that

a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
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doubt," such a conclusion does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment
requirement that a jury make that determination.

Id. at 190. The

Sixth Amendment "requires an actual jury finding of guilty."

Id.

In the present case, the failure to properly instruct the
jury on proof beyond a reasonable doubt denied Mr. Menzies his
"right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Rather than focusing on rules for retroactive application of new
rules of law, this Court should focus on the denial of this

H/

basic

protectio[n]' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without
which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function."
191.

Id. at

Because "there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of

the Sixth Amendment" in this case, the conviction and death sentence
cannot stand.

POINT III. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE
ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF MENZIES' ENTIRE PRISON
FILE IN LIGHT OF THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE
CONTENTS.
Although the majority did not address the bulk of the
issues raised regarding the admission of Mr. Menzies' entire prison
file, Justice Stewart "submit[ted] that it was error for the trial
court to admit defendant's prison record in bulk."

Menzies, 235

Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. Mr. Menzies requests that this Court
reconsider its resolution of this issue.
Due process requires that evidence submitted in
the penalty phase of a capital homicide case have
some degree of relevance and reliability.
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980).
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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In

ate v. Mills Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071, this Court held that due
ocess in sentencing was violated where an unreliable report
>ntaining double and triple hearsay was introduced during
mtencing; see also United States v, Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3rd
Lr. 1993); United States v, Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).
i addition, the Eighth Amendment requires reliability in
entencing.

State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989).

The prison file contains many unreliable reports which
ontain double and triple hearsay.
6-8.

See Appellant's reply brief at

The overwhelming unreliability of these materials and the

potential for introduction of prison files in future cases
lemonstrates the importance of this Court directly addressing this
.ssue.

POINT IV. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE AND
OTHER UNADJUDICATED BAD ACTS IS NOT HARMLESS
ERROR.
In its opinion, this Court determined that the trial
judge's failure to make written findings pursuant to State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other
grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1992), was
harmless error.
reasoned that

Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. This Court

l!

[t]he prior bad acts referred to are quite minor when

compared to the other evidence of aggravating circumstances."
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30.
During the penalty phase of this case, the State introduced
evidence regarding a significant number of unadjudicated bad acts.
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The trial judge did not make the required Lafferty findings and the
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Menzies
committed these acts.

This unadjudicated conduct which was not

proven beyond a reasonable doubt includes inter alia;
1.

Exhibit 1-D double and triple hearsay
regarding knife incidents, including an
incident where Menzies allegedly threatened
a girl with a knife;

2.

Prison file double hearsay report that
Menzies stabbed another inmate. E8:222-5;

3.

Prison file hearsay allegations of threats
to inmates and others. E8:205-84, T. 3260;

4.

Prison file hearsay allegation that Menzies
raped another inmate. E8:180.

The State failed to prove these incidents beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The number and type of incidents coupled with the

trial judge's explicit statement that he considered much of the
unproven other crimes evidence demonstrates that the erroneous
introduction of this evidence was not harmless.

See T. 3248-75.

In

addition, the judge's apparent misunderstanding that a preponderance
of the evidence standard controlled (T. 3138) further demonstrates
the unfair prejudice of this evidence.
The State introduced other evidence of unadjudicated
conduct by live testimony, e.g.,

the alleged screwdriver incident at

the state hospital (T. 2809-27) ; testimony of Jay Labrum regarding
alleged automobile thefts, drug dealing, and drug use (T. 2762-5).
The trial judge failed to make Lafferty findings regarding these
alleged incidents.

Hence, this Court is unable to "adequately

assess whether imposition of a death sentence has been improperly
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sed on evidence of other crimes which have not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt."

Laffertyf 749 P.2d at 1259 fn.16.

This Court recognized in Laffertyf 749 P.2d at 1259, that:
Allowing the sentencer to be influenced by
material relating to crimes which have not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt would appear to
violate the Supreme Court's ruling in Gregg that
evidence admitted during the sentencing must not
unfairly prejudice the accused.
The uncontrolled admission of unadjudicated prior acts, the
ilure to prove such acts beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial
Ldge's failure to make written findings resulted in an unfair and
•ejudicial penalty hearing in violation of the Eighth and
mrteenth Amendments.

Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this

>urt reconsider its resolution of this issue.

POINT V. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
RESOLUTION OF MENZIES# CLAIM THAT APPLICATION OF
THE HEINOUSNESS AGGRAVATOR REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY
PHASE.
The trial judge stated:
I will go over the aggravating circumstances
first, and then the mitigating circumstances, and
interspersed in the aggravating circumstances may
be mitigating circumstances . . . .
. 3249.

The judge then stated, •»[i]n starting with the aggravating

ircumstances, I will start with the nature of the crime."
. 3249.

The judge then listed by number five aggravating

ircumstances relating to the nature of the crime.

The fifth

ircumstance was the erroneous heinousness aggravator.
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T. 3250.

Five, 76-2-210(Q), "the homicide"—or that
might be (G). No, that might be (Q), "the
homicide was committed in an especially heinous,
atrocious, cruel manner demonstrated by serious
bodily injury to the victim before death.
T. 3250.
This explicit reliance, including the effort to clarify th€
appropriate subsection,11 demonstrates that the judge relied on this
improper subsection.

Assuming that the judge was aware of this

Court's "previous decisions limiting capital murders deemed ruthless
and brutal to those 'involving an aggravated battery or torture'"
does not undo the explicit reliance evidenced in the record in this
case.

Furthermore, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is replete with

examples of situations where trial judges have not read or followed
cases limiting the application of the heinousness aggravator.

In

addition, this case is filled with examples of circumstances where
the trial judge did not follow case law from this Court.

For

example, this Court recognized that "the trial judge did not make
written findings that the prior bad acts evidenced by material found

10. The reference to 76-2-2 is apparently a transcription error.
See State v. Menziesy 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992).
11. In the Menzies opinion, the Court stated, "[t]he prosecutor,
however, did not refer the court to the 'heinous' provision in
section 76-5-202(1)(q)." Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. The
prosecutor argued in both opening and rebuttal that the heinousness
aggravator applied. T. 3209, 3236-7. Not specifically delineating
the heinousness code section does not change the fact that the
prosecutor argued that the heinousness aggravator applied. The
trial judge apparently looked up the code section and made an extra
effort to be sure that he cited the correct subsection when
discussing the heinousness aggravator. This extra effort by the
trial judge demonstrates further that he did, in fact, rely on the
heinousness aggravator in assessing sentence.
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in his prison file had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as
required by our decision in State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah
1988)."

Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. The record in this case

establishes that counsel provided the trial judge with the Lafferty
opinion; nevertheless, the trial judge failed to make the explicitly
required findings.

The assumption that the trial judge was familiar

with Wood and followed its directives should not be made given that
the trial judge did not follow directives in cases which were
provided to him.
Where a sentencer improperly relies on an invalid
aggravating factor, the reviewing court must, at the very least,
reweigh the remaining aggravating factors and mitigating
circumstances or conduct a harmless error review.

As outlined in

Petitioner's reply brief at 54-6, the significant weight given the
heinousness aggravator in death penalty determinations and under the
circumstances of this case requires a new penalty hearing.

The

ability of the judge to consider the nature and circumstances of the
crime does not relieve the reviewing court from the requirement that
it reweigh the factors or conduct a harmless error review.
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court rehear this issue.

POINT VI. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
REFUSAL TO ADDRESS MENZIES' CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE IMPROPERLY RELIED ON THE PECUNIARY GAIN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
Mr. Menzies argued that the trial judge violated due
rocess and the Eighth Amendment by explicitly relying on the

pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in addition to the robbery
circumstance based on the same evidence.

Appellant's opening brief

at 165-7; reply brief at 56-58. This Court did not address this
issue in the opinion.
In Parsons v. Barnesf 230 Utah Adv Rep. 3, 10-11 (Utah
1994), this Court held that a capital defendant could not be charged
with both the pecuniary gain and robbery aggravating circumstances
based on the same conduct.

This Court reasoned that "under the

present scheme, defendants who commit a homicide in the course of a
robbery will always begin the sentencing hearing with two
aggravating factors against them for no other reason than that the
underlying felony was a robbery.

[citations omitted]."

Parsons,

230 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. This Court recognized the inherent
unfairness of such a scheme and that this "double-counting" fails to
"narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty," as
required by the Eighth Amendment.

Id.

Pursuant to Parsons and the cases cited by Menzies in his
opening and reply briefs, the trial judge committed Eighth Amendment
error when he relied on the pecuniary gain aggravating
circumstance.

Espinoza v. Florida,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 2926,

120 L.Ed.2d 954 (1992), citing Sochor v. Florida, 540 U.S.
S.Ct. 2114, 2119, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992).

, 112

"Employing an invalid

aggravating factor in the weighing process 'creates the
possibility . . . of randomness."

Sochor, 19 L.Ed.2d at 336,

erupting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 367 (1992).
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,

, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117

When the sentencer relied on an invalid aggravating factor,
the reviewing court may not merely affirm the sentence because such
an approach "deprives a defendant of 'the individualized treatment
that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating
factors and aggravating circumstances.'"

Sochor, 119 L.Ed.2d at

337, citing demons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752, 110 S.Ct.
1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990).

Instead, the reviewing court must

either "reweigh without the invalid aggravating factor or determine
that weighing the invalid factor was harmless error."12

Id.

Petitioner respectfully requests that in this case, where
the trial judge relied on the invalid pecuniary gain aggravating
circumstances, this Court reconsider its decision.

POINT VII. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
RESOLUTION OF MENZIES' CLAIM THAT THE ADMISSION
OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY
HEARING.
Menzies argued that the admission of victim impact evidence
during the penalty phase violated the Eighth Amendment and Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-207(2) in addition to Article I, Section 9 of the Utah
Constitution.

Appellant's opening brief at 184-8.

In State v.

garter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 at 32-33, this Court held "that victim
mpact evidence is inadmissible under subsection 76-3-207(2) of the
tah Code.

This Court stated:

2. As Menzies argued in his reply brief, reliance on this
Iditional improper aggravating circumstance may well have been the
:humb on the scale" which tipped the balance towards a death
mtence. In addition, improper reliance on this factor and the
dnousness factor had the cumulative effect of prejudicing Menzies.
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Permitting the State to introduce victim impact
evidence shifts the focus of the proceeding from
the defendant to the victim and the effect of the
murder on the victim's family and community.
This shift adds nothing to the culpability
analysis and is fraught with danger. [citation
omitted]
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33.
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court
reconsider his argument that the admission of victim impact evidence
requires a new trial in light of the Utah statutory limitations on
such evidence.

POINT VIII. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS MENZIES'
CLAIM THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY
BECAUSE OTHERWISE MR. MENZIES MIGHT BE PAROLED
AND/OR ESCAPE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY HEARING.
This Court did not address Menzies' claims that the
prosecutor's arguments that Menzies might be paroled and/or escape
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I,
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution and required a new penalty
hearing.
65-7.

See Appellant's brief at 176-8, 179-81; reply brief at

After the prosecutor made such arguments, the trial judge

explicitly relied on the possibility of parole or escape as factors
supporting the imposition of the death penalty.

T. 3211, 3254.

Appellant maintains that (1) the evidence did not support
an argument that someone in Appellant's position would ever be
paroled or that anyone housed in the current Uintah II maximum
security facility had ever escaped, and (2) such argument is
improper, based on speculation and violates the state and federal
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constitutions.

See State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 421 fn.4

(Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (argument by prosecution
that the death penalty should be imposed because the defendant might
be paroled and kill again " . . . is disingenuous, unprofessional and
improper . . ."; Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165, 1185 (Ala. Cr.
App. 1990) (improper for prosecutor to argue possibility of parole);
People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d 119, 134 (111. 1984),- Collier v. State,
705 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Nev. 1985).
The emotional impact of such an argument on the sentencer
coupled with the frequency with which such arguments are made by
prosecutors in capital cases in Utah demonstrates the need for this
Court to directly address this issue.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court either
reverse his conviction and/or death sentence or rehear the issues
set forth herein.
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\yseT's cteims Nos. 51-602-5 and 51-602-1. afcgravauag circumstance duriag the pea&ity
These contentions were not ruled on by the trial phase; (v) admission of victim impact evidence
court and consequently are not before us for during the penalty phase; and (vi) use of the
review in the proceeding. If plaintiffs have incorrect standard in sentencing Menzies to
properly raised these issues in their section -24 death. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
As background, we recite those facts that are
petition and/or their objections to the addendum,
they are before the trial court, and a largely undisputed. At approximately 9:50 p.m.
determination will be made when further on Sunday, February 23, 1986, Salt Lake
County Sheriff's deputies were dispatched to the
proceedings are had upon remand.
Gas-A-Mat station located at 3995 West 4700
WE CONCUR:
South. The deputies found customers waiting to
Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief Justice
pay, but the cashier's booth empty and the door
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice
locked. The station attendant, Maurine
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Hunsaker, was missing, although her coat was
Leonard H. Russon, Court of Appeals Judge
Hall, Justice, does not participate herein; still in the booth and a radio was playing. A
Russon; Judge, sat prior to his appointment to preliminary accounting indicated that
approximately $70 in cash was missingfromthe
this court.
register.!
At approximately 11:05 that same night,
1. The current statutory provisions for the general Maurine telephoned her husband, Jim, at their
adjudication of water rights are at Utah Code Ann- home. Deputy Scott Gamble was with Jim at the
§§73-4-1 through -24.
time. Maurine told her husband that she had
been robbed and kidnapped, but that her
SSaSSSSSSSSSSSSSSBaSSBBSSSSSSHaSSSSBRSB?
abductor(s) intended to release her sometime that
night. Deputy Gamble also spoke with Maurine,
Cite as
and she again indicated that a robbery had
235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23
occurred. However, Deputy Gamble was unable
to get a clear answer regarding the kidnapping.
Maurine also refused, or was unable, to answer
IN THE SUPREME COURT
Gamble's question regarding her location. When
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Jim again spoke with his wife, she asked him
what she should do. The line then went dead.
STATE of Utah,
At approximately 5 p.m. on Tuesday,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
February 25, 1986, a hiker discovered Maurine
v.
Hunsaker's body at the Storm Mountain picnic
Ralph LeRoy MENZIES,
area in Big Cottonwood Canyon. She had been
Defendant and Appellant.
strangled and her throat cut. Her purse, which
had not been found at the gas station, was not
No. 880161
with the body or in the immediate area. That
same evening, a jailer at the Salt Lake County
FILED: March 29, 1994
Jail found several identification cards belonging
to Maurine Hunsaker in a desk drawer in one of
Third District, Salt Lake County
the jail's changing rooms. He recognized the
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
picture on the driver's license as a woman
reported missing the night before on television
ATTORNEYS:
news.
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., Charlene
Detectives later determined how the cards got
Barlow, J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Asst. Att'ys
into the drawer. Menzies had been booked into
Gen., Salt Lake City> for plamuff
the jail on unrelated charges at approximately
Brooke C. Wells, Joan C. Watt, Richard G.
6:40 jp.m. on Monday, February 24, 1986. He
Uday, Salt Lake City, for defendant
leftlhe booking area for a short time without
supervision and was found in a changing room.
Shortly thereafter, Maurine Hunsaker's
This opinion is subject to revision before
identification cards were found in a clothing
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
hamper in that room. Unaware of the
kidnapping, the officer who found the cards
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Ralph LeRoy Menzies appeals his 1988 jury placed them in the desk drawer where the jailer
conviction for capital murder and the trial found them Tuesday night.
Also on Tuesday evening, a high school
court's subsequent imposition of the dea&
penalty. Menzies raises numerous claims of student named Tim Larrabee was watching the
error in the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, news and learned that a hiker had discovered a
including (i) failure to remove five jurors for woman's body at Storm Mountain. On
cause; (\\) failure to grant a mistrial following Wednesday, Larrabee notified deputies that he
"surprise" testimony; (iii) admission of and his girlfriend, Beth Brown, had skipped
preliminary hearing testimony of a jailhouse school on Monday, February 24th, and were at
informant; fiv) consideration of a heinousness Storm Mountam. Larrabee had
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State v. Menzies
235 Utan Adv. Zip. 23

Codc«Co
Provo, Utah

Following a month-long trial, a jury convicted
full-sized, two-door, late-1960s model,
cream-colored automobile in the parking lot. He Menzies of capital homicide and aggravated
said that the vehicle was similar in appearance to kidnapping. After Menzies waived the jury in
a 1968 Buick Riviera. Larrabee and Brown also the penalty phase, the trial judge sentenced him
saw a man and woman at the site but saw to death. Menzies then moved for a new trial,
nothing unusual happening between the two. arguing that errors in recording and transcribing
They later heard a short scream, but Larrabee made the record inadequate for purposes of
thought that the woman had slipped or had been appellate review. The trial court denied the
frightened by an animal. Approximately fifteen motion, and this court affirmed, ordering
minutes later, Larrabee saw the man walking Menzies to proceed with the appeal on the
alone. Neither Larrabee nor Brown saw the merits. Suite v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah
woman again.
1992). We now address Menzies' contentions.
Menzies' first issue on appeal deals with the
Larrabee described the suspect as a white
male, 25-30 years of age, 6 T tall, with a jury selection process. He claims that the trial
medium build (approximately 170 pounds), I court should have removed four jurors for cause
.black, curly hair, prominent sideburns and a because of their attitudes regarding the death
mustache, and wearing wire-rimmed glasses. A penalty and a fifth because that juror was unable
detective created a composite drawing of a to be impartial during the guilt phase of the
possible suspect based on this description. After trial. Menzies removed all five by peremptory
learning that Maurine's identification cards had challenge. He now asserts that the trial court
been found at the jail, sheriffs detectives committed reversible error by forcing defense
compared the composite drawing with the counsel to use a peremptory strike to remove
photographs of more than two hundred inmates potential jurors when the trial court should have
who had been booked into the facility from removed those jurors for cause. Menzies makes
February 23 rd through the 25th. Three no attempt to demonstrate that the forced use of
photographs were chosen as possible matches, any of these peremptory challenges was harmful.
.including that of defendant Menzies.
Instead, he relies on the automatic reversal rule
Detective Jerry Thompson questioned Menzies of Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah
regarding the Hunsaker homicide. Menzies said 1975), and its progeny. Under these cases,
that on Sunday, February 23rd, he borrowed a reversal is required whenever a party is
car from Troy Denter and picked up a young compelled "to exercise a peremptory challenge
woman on State Street that evening. He told the to remove a panel member who should have
detective that while with this woman, he picked been stricken for cause." State v. Bishop, 753
up his girlfriend, Nicole Arnold, and drove P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988); see also Crawford,
around until the two women began to argue. 542 P.2d at 1093.
Menzies reportedly dropped off Nicole and then
The State, on the other hand, asks us to
left the unidentified woman somewhere around overturn the Crawford line of cases and follow
7200 West and 2400 South. According to the approach utilized by a majority of the states
Menzies, he then went home, where he talked and upheld by the federal courts. Those
with Nicole.
following the majority approach "reject the
On February 28th, detectives questioned notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge
Denter. He told them he loaned his constitutes a violation of the constitutional right
cream-colored 1974 Chevrolet to Menzies on to an impartial jury." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487
Sunday, February 23rd, sometime in the U.S. 81, 88 (1988). "So long as the jury that
afternoon. He said that Menzies did not return sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had
the car until the afternoon of Monday, February to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that
24th. Detectives then took Larrabee and Brown result does not mean the [Constitution] was
to the jail parking lot, where they identified violated." Id. (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S.
Deuter's car as the one they saw at Str rm 430, 436 (1887)). To prevail on a claim ot error
Mountain. They were also shown a photospread based on the failure to remove a juror for cause,
consisting of six photographs. Larrabee indicated a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz.,
that Menzies appeared to be the man he saw at show that a member of the jury was partial or
Storm Mountain. Several months later, however, incompetent. See id. at 89. We agree with the
Larrabee did not correctly identify Menzies in a State and overrule Crawford and its progeny.
lineup.
We note at the outset that Crawford's per se
Detectives found Maurine Hunsaker's rule is a relatively recent development in Utah
fingerprint in Denter's car and located her purse law. Utah case law dating back to territorial
in Menzies* apartment. Menzies was charged times did not presume prejudice when a trial
with first degree murder, a capital offense. See court erroneously failed to remove a prospective
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202.2 After the charges juror for cause and forced a party to use a
were filed, Walter Button, Menzies* ceil mate, peremptory challenge. For example, in People
contacted detectives about the homicide. Britton v. Hopt, 9 P. 407 (Utah 1886), ajfd, 120 U.S.
said that on February 27th, Menzies told him 430, 442 (1887), an early death penalty case,
that he killed Hunsaker to prevent her from the defendant complained that he was prejudiced
testifying against him.
because the court had failed to excuse three
jurors for cause. The defendant did not exhaust
UTAH
:E REPORTS
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State v. Merunes
235 Utah Auv. Rep. 23
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of his peremptory challenges, and one of the supreme court. Nevertheless, we wish to make
ee challenged jurors sat on the jury. On clear that the doctrine is neither mechanical nor
rigid as it relates to courts of last resort. See
>eal, this court held:
Stoker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423-24
Al perfect answer to the point raised is that
(Utah 1990); American Fork City v. Crosgrove,
>f the three jurors challenged two were not
701 P.2d 1069, 1071-75 (Utah 1985).
worn. One was challenged peremptorily by
The general American doctrine as applied to
be defendant, and one by the people.
Whether, therefore, the challenges were
courts of last resort is that a court is not
>roperly denied or not, they did not sit as
inexorably bound by its own precedents but
urors; the defendant was not prejudiced by
will follow the rule of law which it has
he ruling.
established in earlier cases, unless clearly
convinced that the rule was originally
at 408; see also Van Wagoner v. Union Pac.
R., 186 P.2d 293, 298-99 (Utah 1947); State
erroneous or is no longer sound because of
Zano, 228 P. 563, 568 (Utah 1924); State v.
changing conditions and that more good than
>rne, 126 P. 286, 291 (Utah 1912). As for harm will come by departing from
challenged juror who actually sat, this court
precedent.
ognized that the defendant still had John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial
emptory challenges remaining and held that Decision, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 367 (1957); see
il the defendant exhausted his peremptory also Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 333 U.S.
dlenges he could not complain about the 445, 471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) ("When
nposition of the jury. Hopt, 9 P. at 408; see precedent and precedent alone is all the
o State v. Wetzel, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 argument that can be made to support a
5c. 30, 1993); State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's
p. 12, 13 (Dec. 30, 1993).
creator to destroy it."). Although we do not do
loot remained the ruk in Utah until our 1975 so lightly, we believe that now is the proper
iwford decision. In Crawford, a civil case, time to overrule Crawford. Because we are
plaintiffs exercised one of their three allotted departing from a prior precedent that has been
emptory challenges to remove a panelist followed for approximately twenty years, it is
am the trial court should have removed for incumbent on us to explain why we overrule it.
se. Although six of eight jurors would have Cf. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 427.
n sufficient to return a verdict and the jury
We note that Crawford is not the most weighty
nimously found against the plaintiffs, this of precedents. First, in establishing Crawford's
rt refused to conclude that the error was per se rule, Justice Ellett not only failed to
mless. Crawford, 542 P.2d at 1093. In explain why he was abandoning the
srsing the jury verdict, Justice Ellett asserted, long-established Hopt rule, see Monell v.
exercising one of their peremptory Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436
Uengesupon this prospective juror, plaintiffs U.S. 658, 695 (1978), but failed to cite that line
only two remaining. The juror which of cases altogether. Because the briefs in
ained because the plaintiffs had no challenge Crawford addressed the issue only tangentiaily
emove him may have been a hawk amid and never cited the Hopt line of cases, it seems
m doves and imposed his will upon them." likely that Justice Ellett and the rest of the court
Interestingly, Justice Ellett made this did not even realize that they were departing
rtion even though the plaintiffs did not from well-established Utah precedent. See 20
plain that any of the jurors who sat were Am. Jur. 2d Courts §193 (1965) ("[S]tare
sd or prejudiced against them,
decisis effect of case is substantially diminished
lose asking us to overturn prior precedent by the fact that the legal point therein was
> a substantia] burden of persuasion. See decided without argument.").
> v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah
Second, Justice Ellett established the per se
>). This burden is mandated by the doctrine rule wiih little analysis and without reference to
are decisis. In State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d authority. In other situations where we have
> (Utah 1993), we discussed stare decisis in established presumptions of harm, we have
context of multiple panels of the court of carefully discussed the reasons for taking such
als and emphasized the importance of its an unusual step. See, e.g., State v. Crowley, 766
rvance:
P.2d 1069,1071-72 (Utah 1988) (closure of trial
is doctrine, under which the first decision
to friends and relatives of accused); State v.
a court on a particular question of law
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920-22 (Utah 1987)
/eras later decisions by the same court, is
(prosecutor's failure to disclose materials sought
cornerstone of the Anglo-American
by defense); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750,
isprudence that is crucial to the
752-54 (Utah 1986) (gruesome photographs).
dictability of the law and the fairness of
Third, in addition to Crawford%s lack of
udication.
acknowledgement prior authority and its weak
:1269.
analytical underpinnings, this court has
Thurman, we made it clear that the doctrine concluded that its per se rule does not work very
is as between different panels of the court well. See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §187 (1965).
)peals. Id.3 Certainly the doctrine also This conclusion is evidenced by our straining to
ss to a court of last resort, such as a state find that no error has occurred, thus avoiding
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Crawford's mechanical reversal requirement. Menzies claims that this failure to disclose the
See, e.g., State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. conversation violated his right to due process
19 (March 2, 1994) (finding no abuse of under the federal constitution because the
discretion but "strongly advis[ing] trial courts to post-lineup statement was critical to the
be more conservative in the future when making prosecution's case. Because of our disposition of
for-cause determinations in capital cases"); the rule 16 question, we need not indulge in a
Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 (holding "trial separate due-process analysis.
judge was at the very limit of his discretion" in
Under our decision in Knight, when a
refusing to remove prospective juror for cause); prosecutor undertakes to respond voluntarily to
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451-55 (finding trial court discovery requests from the defense, the
did not abuse discretion in refusing to remove prosecutor either must produce "all of the
prospective jurors for cause). We think that material requested or must explicitly identify
candor in the law would be better served by those portions of the request with respect to
abandoning Crawford rather than straining which no responsive material will be provided."
against its requirement by upholding trial courts' 734 P.2d at 916-17. This obligation is ongoing
questionable for-cause determinations.
and is justified as a guard against misleading the
We conclude that even if the trial court erred defense by an incomplete prosecutorial response
in failing to remove those prospective jurors to discovery. If a violation of this duty is found,
whom Menzies found objectionable, that error the trial court may fashion a remedy under rule
was harmless. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 16(g)/
A complaint that the trial court failed to order
Menzies has not asserted that he faced a partial
or biased jury during the guilt phase of his trial a requested remedy or that the remedy ordered
or that the jury was made more likely to convict was insufficient to obviate the harm resulting
as a result of "death qualifying" the jury. Cf. from the violation is reviewed under an
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 342, 386-95, abuse-of-discretion standard, id. at 9iS-19. The
414-17 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, while the trial court's discretion in fashioning a remedy
bulk of Menzies* objections to potential jurors for a violation is not abused unless prejudice
revolved around those individuals' views on the sufficient to result in a reversal of the conviction
death penalty, the penalty phase was tried to the occurred due to the discovery violation. Id.
court rather than to the jury.
In. the present case, the trial court found that
Menzies next claims that the trial court erred the State had failed to disclose requested
in denying his motion for a mistrial following information. For purposes of our analysis today,
"surprise" testimony by Tim Laxxabee, the high we accept that ruling as correct. Defense counsel
school student who saw a man and a woman at asked the trial judge to strike the testimony of
the Storm Mountain picnic area the day of the Larrabee regarding the post-lineup discussion
homicide. This claim of surprise arose from a with the prosecutor. The trial judge granted that
lineup conducted by the sheriffs office in which motion and admonished the jury to disregard the
Larrabee identified someone other than Menzies testimony. Later in the day, defense counsel
as the individual he saw at Storm Mountain. At requested the further remedy of a mistrial. The
trial, the prosecutor did not ask Larrabee about judge denied that request. To conclude that an
the lineup during his case-in-chief. On abuse of discretion occurred, we must find that
cross-examination, however,
Larrabee's unacceptable prejudice to Menzies remained
"misidentification" was brought out by the after the testimony was stricken. This we cannot
defense. On redirect, the prosecutor asked do.
We generally presume that a jury will follow
Larrabee about a conversation the two of them
had while walking back to the prosecutor's the instructions given it. State v. Burk, 839 P.2d
office after the lineup. Larrabee testified that 880, 883-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing State
during the walk, he asked the prosecutor v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974)), cert,
whether "number 6* was the correct person. der.ica, 853 P.2G 897 (Utah 1993). Here, the
testimony consisted of a very brief series of
Number six was Menzies.
Because the prosecution had never informed questions and answers. The court promptly
defense counsel about the post-lineup ordered the colloquy stricken and admonished
conversation, defense counsel moved to strike the jury to ignore it. Considering the ambiguous
the testimony ".concerning [Larrabee's] nature of the testimony and the fact that it was
equivocation of the lineup selection" and not vivid or graphic, there is no reason to
requested that the court admonish the jury not to believe that the jury would be uniquely unable to
consider that testimony. The trial court granted follow the court's instructions and ignore the
the motion, struck the testimony, and instructed testimony. As such, the remedy ordered was
the jury to disregard it. Later that day, the entirely sufficient to cure the discovery
defense moved for a mistrial, but the motion violation.
was denied. Menzies new claims that the trial
Even if we were to assume that for some
judge erred in denying the motion for mistrial.
reason this testimony were of such a dramatic
Menzies' argument is twofold. First, he claims nature that the jury was likely to consider it
that the State violated rule 16 of the Utah Rules despite the court's instructions, we still find no
of Criminal Procedure in failing to disclose harm. When Larrabee first contacted the
Larrabee *s post-lineup statement. Second. sheriffs office, he described a suspect within
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one inch in height and ten pounds in weight of
Menzies. He accurately described Menzies' hair,
facial hair, and glasses and helped create a
composite drawing that was so accurate that
detectives were able to select Menzies'
photograph from among those of 200 inmates.
Larrabee also accurately described and identified
Denter's car There was other substantial
evidence linking Menzies to the homicide,
including the victim's fingerprint m Denter's
car. In light of all this, the fact that on redirect
Larrabee mentioned that he had some notion that
Menzies was the person he should have picked
m the lineup is hardly pivotal to Menzies'
conviction. We conclude that it is extraordinarily
unlikely that any prejudice that might have
survived the striking of Larrabee's testimony
had any effect on the jury, and certainly not an
effect that would nse to the level necessary to
Tequire reversal. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing the motion for a mistrial.
Menzies next asserts that the trial court erred
in allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of
Walter Bntton to be read to the jury. Bntton,
who had shared a cell with Menzies at the Salt
Lake County Jail, testified at the preliminary
hearing that Menzies told him he killed Maunne
Hunsaker. At the time of trial, however, Bntton
refused to testify despite a finding of contempt
by the court. The court thus ruled that Bntton
was "unavailable" as defined m rule 804(a)(2) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence,5 making the
transcnpt of his preliminary hearing testimony
admissible under that rule. The defense moved
to suppress the transcnpt, but the motion was
denied.
Menzies now argues that the admission of
Bntton's preliminary hearing testimony violated
his nght to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment of the Umted States Constitution.
Specifically, he claims that the trial court erred
m finding Bntton unavailable because the
prosecution did not make a good faith effort to
procure Bntton's testimony. Menzies further
claims that even if Bntton was actually
unavailable, the preliminary hearing testimony
should not have been admitted because the
defense did not have *he opportunit} to properlv
develop the testimony it wanted brought out at
tnal during cross-examination, a prerequisite to
admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. In
response, the State asserts that because Bntton
was physically present at tnal, the Confrontation
Clause was not implicated.
Although Bntton's testimony was admissible
under rule 804, we have recognized that the
"admission of certain evidence could be justified
under a hearsay exception [to the rules], yet still
violate the defendant's constitutional nght of
confrontation." Slate v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108,
1111-12 (Utah 1989) (separate opinion of
Zimmerman, J.), State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d
778, 785 n.31 (Utah 1980). As a result, we
must de term me whether admission of Bntton's
testimony has impmged on the values embodied
m the Confrontation Clause to such a degree as
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to rise to the level of a constitutional violation
Webb, 779 P 2d at 1112 (separate opmion of
Zimmerman, J ).
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U S 56 (1980), the
Umted States Supreme Court articulated a
two-pronged test for determining the
admissibility of hearsay when a hearsay
declarant is not present for cross-examination at
tnal. First, there must be a showing of
"unavailability." Id. at 66 Second, if the
declarant is unavailable, the statement at issue is
"admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of
reliability." Id.; see State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d
537,539 (Utah 1981) (adoptmg two-pronged test
established m Roberts).
Addressmg the first prong of the test,
constitutional unavailability is found only when
it is "practically impossible to produce the
witness m court." Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113
(separate opmion of Zimmerman, J.); see State
v White, 671 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1983), State
v. Chapman, 655 P 2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982),
State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct.
App ), cert, denied. 765 P 2d 127" (Utah 1987)
Unavailability will not be found merely because
"the witness would be uncomfortable on the
stand or . . . testifying would be stressful."
Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113 (separate opmion of
Zimmerman, J.). In short, every reasonable
effort must be made to produce the witness. Id
(separate opmion of Zimmerman, J.). Here, the
record indicates that Bntton was physically
present at tnal, pursuant to a court order, and
repeatedly refused to testify despite the judge's
order to do so. We conclude that every
reasonable effort was made to produce Bntton at
tnal, and the tnal court correctly concluded that
Bntton was unavailable.
In the second step of our Confrontation Clause
analysis, we must determine whether Bntton's
preliminary hearing testimony bore sufficient
indicia of reliability to warrant its admission at
tnal. Menzies admits that preliminary hearing
testimony usually meets the reliability standard,
Brooks, 638 P.2d at 540, but argues that the
pnor testimony at issue here was unreliable
because (I) Bntton was a jailhouse informant
whose testimoc> was inherently suspect as he
stood to benefit from the testimony; (n) his
mental competence was at issue and Menzies
was not aware of this untri after the preliminary
hearing; and (ui) defense counsel did not have
the opportunity to examine Bntton at the
preliminary hearing regarding his subsequent
convictions. The State asserts that the testimony
was reliable because Bntton's testimony was
given under oath before a judge and Menzies
was represented by counsel who had the
opportune to cross-examine Bntton
We agree with the 6cate. The cntical issue of
reliability relates to the preliminary hearing
testimony, not to Bntton's potential testimony at
tnal. The defense contends that its
cross-examination of Bntton would have been
more effective at tnal because of events that
occurred after the prelimmarv hearing and
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information that became known alter that time.
While that assertion may be true, as we have
recognized previously, "The Confrontation
Clause guarantees only *an opportunity for
e f f e c t i v e c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might
wish.'" State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 (Utah)
(quoting United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554,
559 (1988)), cert, denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 145
(1993).
Here, the transcript of the preliminary hearing
shows that the defense had the opportunity for
an effective cross-examination of Britton. While
we agree that new evidence obtained after the
hearing may have aided an attack on Britton's
credibility on cross-examination, the preliminary
hearing transcript indicates that the issue was
well-explored. Defense counsel brought out
Britton's criminal history, including pending
charges against him, as well as the fact that
Britton might receive more favorable treatment
by the courts because of his cooperation with
law enforcement officials. Furthermore, the
defense introduced extrinsic evidence related to
Britton's credibility at trial and might have
introduced other credibility-related evidence as
well. For example, the trial transcript indicates
that Britton had been incarcerated in a mental
health section of the county jail before the
preliminary hearing was held.
Reviewing the preliminary hearing testimony
as a whole, we find it contains sufficient indicia
of reliability to warrant its admission at trial. j
We therefore conclude that the requirements of
the Confrontation Clause have been met.
Although not argued below, Menzies now
contends that the trial court committed plain
error by not excluding portions of Britton's
testimony under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, Menzies claims that he
was unfairly prejudiced by Britton's testimony to
the effect that Menzies had said cutting Maurine
Hunsaker's throat was "one of the biggest thrills
that he'd had." In addition, Menzies argues that
Britton's testimony that Menzies laughed about
the homicide should also have been excluded.
We first note that the defense waived the rule
403 issue ?y failing tc interpose an objection to
these statements at trial. As a result, Menzies is
entitled to appellate review only if he can show
that the trial court committed "plain error."
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35 (Utah), cert,
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); State v. Verde,
770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989). To find plain
error, Menzies must establish three elements: (i)
An error occurred; (ii) the error was obvious;
and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see Verde,
770 P.2d at 122. If any one of these elements is
missing, there can be no finding of plain error.
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209.
Here, we dispose of Menzies' challenge under
the first element. Rule 403 requires that
proffered evidence be excluded when its
"probative value is substantially outweighed by
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the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid.
403. Such a weighing should result in exclusion
when the evidence would have "'an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, on an
emotional one.*" State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981,
984 (Utah 1989) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403
advisory committee's note). To find that an
error has been made in admitting evidence in the
face of a rule 403 objection, we must conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting the challenged evidence to be
received. Specifically, we must find that the
ruling in favor of admissibility was beyond the
limits of reasonability. State v. Hamilton, 827
P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).
Our review of the transcript does not lead us
to the conclusion that the trial court exceeded
the bounds of its discretion in admitting the two
challenged statements. While we agree that
Britton's testimony is inflammatory, we do not
conclude that it reaches the level of mandatory
exclusion. Cf. Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984-86
(analyzing letter written by murderer to victim's
father); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 476-77 (plurality
opinion of Hall, CJ.) (discussing gruesome
photographs); id. at 493 (opinion of
Zimmerman, J.) (same); Cloud, 722 P.2d at
752-53 (same); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60,
64-65 (Utah 1983) (same). We think that the
defense has taken the statement regarding
Menzies' thrill at cutting someone's throat out of
context and has placed undue emphasis on it
here:
A Yes, sir. I asked him why he killed her—I
asked him why he shot her, because I did
not know how she was killed.
Q What did he say?
A He stated that he didn't shoot her, that he
cut her throat.
Q Did you ask him anything else?
A Not upon that night. It wasn't until the
next morning, 1 believe, that we talked
further.
Q In that initial conversation, did he give
you any more details regarding the murder?
A No, sir, not really. Tt wasn't until after
we had spoken again, which was the next
morning, that he really went into details on
it.

Q Where did that second conversation take
place the next morning?
A That second conversation took place in
the same place, there in the tier.
Q And how did that conversation come
about?
A That conversation came about upon our
awakening, and he started talking to me.
And he'd asked me if I had ever cut
anybody's throat before.
Q What did you say to that?
A 1 said yes, sir, I have.
Q What did he say next?
A And he said it was one of the biggest
thrills that he'd had.
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\ s for the statement about Menzies* laughing heinousness factor listed in 76-5-202(1 )(q).
Furthermore, we note that the judge could
len he spoke of the homicide, we note that
is statement
was elicited
during have properly considered the nature and
Dss-examination by the defense. Furthermore, circumstances of the crime, including its
s statement was made in response to questions brutality and what the prosecutor apparently
yarding possible confrontations between referred to colloquially as heinousness, as an
itton and Menzies at the county jail; there was aggravating factor under section 76-3-207(2). In
reference to the Hunsaker homicide itself this guise, the various facts of the crime that
ring the exchange. In fact, the homicide itself Menzies says do not rise to the level of
d not been mentioned by defense counsel for constitutional and statutory heinousness could
proximately ten transcript pages before the still have been considered. Therefore, even if we
itement. We find no merit to the claim of were to assume that the court erred in
considering heinousness, we think that the error
iin error.
Menzies argues that in the penalty phase of the was harmless because we "can still confidently
d,
the judge improperly considered conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
inousness as an aggravating circumstance and, remaining aggravating circumstances and factors
: re fore, he is entitled to a new penalty phase, outweigh the mitigating factors and that the
cause the objection was not raised at trial, we ! imposition of the death penalty was justified and
ain must consider whether there was plain appropriate." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,
1248 (Utah), cert, denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 427
-or.
rhe Utah Code provides that the death penalty (1993).
iv be sought when
Menzies next argues that the trial court erred
t)he homicide was committed in an
by relying on victim impact evidence during the
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or
penalty phase in violation of article I, section 9
exceptionally depraved manner, any of
of the Utah Constitution. Because Menzies did
vhich must be demonstrated by physical
not object to the victim impact evidence at trial,
orture, serious physical abuse, or serious
we must consider this claim under a plain-error
>odily injury of the victim before death,
analysis. Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35. Again, to
ah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(q). In State v. find plain error, we must find that (i) an error
ttley 780 P.2d 1203, 1217 (Utah 1989), cert, occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the
nied, 494 U.S. 1C18 (1990), decided after this error was harmful. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.
;e was tried, we said that for subpart (q) to
Menzies claims that at the time of the
;s federal constitutional muster under the sentencing phase, the United States Supreme
preme Court's decision in Godfrey v. Court's decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482
orgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), "the physical U.S. 496 (1987), prevented the consideration of
lse must be qualitatively and quantitatively victim impact evidence as a violation of the
ferent and more culpable than that necessary Eighth Amendment of the United States
accomplish the murder." Menzies now argues Constitution. Because the trial judge should have
t the circumstances surrounding the homicide been aware of this ruling, Menzies argues that
h which he was charged did not rise to the an obvious error occurred when the evidence
el of heinousness required by the United I was considered during sentencing.
tes Constitution as construed in Tuttle.
I
We do not agree. In Booth, the Court's
a its closing argument, the State listed the concern appeared to be based on the fact that
;ravating factors it wanted the court to victim
impact
evidence
created
"a
isider and stated that one such factor was "the constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury
tal and heinous nature of the murder." The may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and
secutor, however, did not refer the court to capricious manner." 482 U.S. at 503. With no
"heinous" provision in section 76-5-202(1 )(q) jury sitting during the penalty phase, we do not
the Code. When the trial court enumerated think that Booth's application to this case should
aggravating and mitigating factors at the time have been obvious to the trial judge. Cf. State v.
sentencing, it noted subpart (q). While we Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989)
ik that it would have been error for the court ("Erroneous admissions of evidence are not as
consider subpart (q) satisfied by the facts of critical in a bench trial as where a jury is
case and to use that finding as an involved . . . ."). 6
ravating factor, we are not convinced that
Finally, Menzies argues that the trial court
b an error occurred. The trial judge was failed to apply the standard set forth in Wood,
lainly aware of our previous decisions 648 P.2d at 83-84, in imposing the death
iting capital murders deemed ruthless and penalty. There, we held that in order to impose
tal to those "involving an aggravated battery the death penalty, the sentencing body must find
torture." State v. Wood, 648 P 2d 71, S6 beyond a reasonable doubt that the substantiality
in 1981) (construing and applymg Godfrey), or persuasiveness of the aggravating factors
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). While we outweighs that of the mitigating factors, and
uncomfortable with the trial judge's must then conclude, also beyond a reasonable
fences to subpart (q), we have no solid doubt, that the death penalty is appropriate. Id.
son to believe that the judge thought this was
Menzies asserts that the trial court failed to
appropriate situation for reliance on the | properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating
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factors and then incorrectly concluded that the
death penalty was appropriate. We do not agree.
The first prong of Wood requires that the
sentencing body find that the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt. 648 P.2d at 83-84. While we
realize that the trial judge recited a number of
.factors during the sentencing proceeding, the
record indicates that he weighed those factors in
the manner required by Wood:
The court has, to the best of the court's
ability, weighed and evaluated the mitigating
circumstances and the aggravating
circumstances. And the conclusion the court
has reached is that based on the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the court
concludes that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, Wood requires that the sentencing
body find that the death penalty is the
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.
648 P.2d at 84. Again, the record indicates that
the trial judge properly apphed the law:
Consequently, this court, with the heaviest
of hearts, makes the more difficult and
trying decision that under the circumstances
and beyond a reasonable doubt, the death
penalty is the appropriate penalty, and the
court so orders.
We therefore find no merit to Menzies' claim
that the trial judge applied an inappropriate
standard when he sentenced Menzies to death.
Menzies also points out that the trial judge did
not make written findings that the prior bad acts
evidenced by material found in his prison file
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as
required by our decision in State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted
on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546 (10th Cir. 1992). While we have required
written findings regarding unadjudicated bad acts
if the sentence is determined by a judge, we
have not said that such findings are
constitutionally required and that a failure to
make such findings mandates reversal. Id. at
1260 n.16. Rather, we can look to the other
evidence before the trial court to be ceruin that
the death sentence would have been imposed
even without the improper evidence. Id.
Reviewing the record before us, we think that
the error was harmless. The prior bad acts
referred to are quite minor when compared to
the other evidence of aggravating circumstances.
We conclude that the facts indicate "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the remaining aggravating
circumstances and factors outweigh the
mitigating factors and that the imposition of the
death penalty was justified and appropriate,"
despite the trial court's consideration of the
prison file. See Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1248.
Therefore, any error was harmless. See Lafferty,
749 P.2d at 1261 (citing State v. Hackford, 737
P.2d 200, 204-05 & n.3 (Utah 1987)).
We find Menzies' other claims to be without
merit.7 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the
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jury's verdict and the trial court's subsequen
sentence.
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Russell W. Bench, Court of Appeals Judge
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that part of the majority opinion
that overturns the rule requiring reversal when
a party has been compelled to exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who
should have been removed for cause. ]
emphasize, however, that if a trial judge errs in
not striking a juror on a for-cause challenge and
a defendant then expends a peremptory challenge
to remove that juror, reversal may still be
required if the defendant can demonstrate actual
prejudice in having lost the peremptory
challenge. Concededly, it will be much more
difficult to establish reversible error under this
rule, but the cost of reversing a conviction for
an error of the trial judge that is corrected by a
peremptory challenge with no demonstrable
prejudice to the defendant is too great, if not
irrational.
I dissent from the result and note that this case
has been mishandled from the beginning. First,
the transcript of the trial and penalty phase
contains a multitude of errors, and portions of
that transcript may be missing. This caused
Menzies to challenge the sufficiency of the
record for appellate review. State v. Menzies,
845 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 1992). The Court,
however, rejected Menzies9 assertion that the
record was unreliable and held that the errors in
the transcript were not prejudicial, although
accuracy of the transcript was at best
problematic. Id. I thought then that the case
should have been retried, and I dissented from
the Court's opinion.
Defendant now asserts forty-four claims of
error on appeal. The majority decides to address
only six and summarily dismisses the remaining
thirty-eight on the unexamined, conclusory
assertion that they are all without merit.
Althougn seme of the issues lack sufficient merit
to require discussion, some of them raise
substantial claims that should be addressed. For
example, the trial court's instruction on the
State's burden of proof was undeniably in error.
It violated the clear ruling of this Court in State
v. Johnson, T74 P.2d 1141, 1147^8 (Utah
1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result,
joined by Durham and Zimmerman, JJ.). See
State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah
1989); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41
(1990) (per curiam) (Ujited States Supreme
Court adopted similar position and held that
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction in that
case required reversal of conviction).
The majority now addresses the issue in a
footnote. It erroneously concludes that the
correct rule with respect to a reasonable doubt
instruction is not entitled to retroactive
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application Contrary to the majority opmion, it
is well-established law that a judicial opmion
changing a rule of criminal law is automatically
applied retroactively to criminal cases pending
on direct appeal Stare v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577,
583 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986),
State v. Belgard, 615 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Utah
1980). The majority asserts that our rulings on
the reasonable doubt instruction m Ireland and
Johnson should not be applied retroactively to
this case because "*the automatic rule of
retroactivity as to nonfinal judgments only
applies to significant changes of rules that are
not expressly declared to be prospective m
operation.'" Norton, 625 P.2d at 584 The
majority asserts that a proper reasonable doubt
instruction is a significant change that represents
a "clear break with the past." Id. at 583. That
assertion is incorrect. A proper reasonable doubt
instruction has always meant "beyond" a
reasonable doubt and has meant that for a very
long time.
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which should not be admitted
Undoubtedly, there are also other issues that
should be addressed. Nowhere is the mtegnty of
the law more important than when a person's
life is at stake To preserve that mtegnty, we
have gone the extra mile m death cases and
addressed and decided issues even though no
proper objection was made at tnal when an error
was manifest and prejudicial. State v. Wood,
648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982). Now, however,
the Court summarily disposes of over thirty
allegations of error with the summary statement
that they are "without ment."
Hall, Justice, does not participate herem,
Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

1. An area manager for Gas-A-Mat later conducted a
more thorough accounting and determined that
approximately $116 in cash was missing
2. The current version of section "6-5-202 substitutes
the term "aggravated murder" for murder in the first
degree
3. We note that the doctrine of stare decisis as it
Furthermore, neither Ireland nor Johnson applies to a court of appeals has two facets Vertical
"expressly declared" that they are to be applied stare decisis, the first of these two facets, compels a
prospectively only. The majority states that court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a
Ireland indicated an intent by the Court that the higher court See J agree v Board of School Comm'rs,
change m the reasonable doubt instruction was 459 U S 1314, 1316 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1983),
only to be applied prospectively. The language In re Marriage of Thurhn, 746 P 2d 929, 934 (Ariz
in Ireland that the majority refers to, however, Ct App 1987) Under this mandate, lower courts are
was not m any way related to prospective or obliged to follow the holding of a higher court, as
retroactive application of the decision. The well as any "judicial dicta" that may be announced by
Court stated that it had "concerns" with the the higher court See Lewis v Sava, 602 F Supp
potential effects of the instruction and that the 571,573(DCNY \9%A),Fogertyv State,231 Cal
Rptr 810, 815 (Ct App 1986), Ex parte Harrison,
instruction should no longer be given. As stated
741 S W 2d 607, 608-09 (Tex Ct App 1987) See
by the majority, a decision is automatically generally Robert E Keeton, Venturing To Do Justice
applied retroactively to nonfinal judgments Reforming Private Law 25-38 (1969), 21 C J S
unless we expressly declare otherwise. The Courts §142, at 169-70 (1990) Horizontal stare
language m Ireland cited by the majority does decisis, the second facet, requires that a court of
not even cite to Norton or any of our other cases appeals follow its own prior decisions This doctrine
on retroactivity. See, e.g , Belgard, 615 P.2d at applies with equal force to courts comprised of
1275. That language hardly qualifies as an multiple panels, requiring each panel to observe the
"express declaration" of prospective application. prior decisions of another State v Thurman, 846
Neither does Johnson expressly declare that the P 2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) Horizontal stare decisis
does not, however, require that a panel adhere to its
new rule has only prospective application.
own or another panel's prior decisions with the same
Next, I submit that it was error for the trial inflexibility as does vertical stare decisis See Opsal v
court to admit defendant's prison record m bulk. Unuea Sens Auto Ass'n 283 J«il Rptr 212,216
Due process requires that evidence submitted in (Ct App 1992), State v Dugan, 718 P 2d 1010,
the penalty phase of a capital homicide case 1014 (Ariz Ct App 1986) Instead, although it may
have some degree of relevance and reliability. not do so lightly, a panel may overrule its own or
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980) anotner panel's decision where "the decision is clearly
(opinion of Wilkins, J., with Maughan, J., erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render
concurring m this part of the opmion, and the prior decision inapplicable " Dugan, 718 P 2d at
Stewart, J., concurring m the judgment); see 1014
also Mills v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 4. Rule 16(g) provides
If at any tune during the course of the
(Utah 1993). The trial court did not evaluate
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
either the reliability or the relevance of any of
court that a party has failed to comply with this
the evidence contained in the file. Although the
rule, the court may order such party to permit the
trial judge, not a jury, imposed the death
discovery or mspec >r gran a continuance or
penalty, there is no way of knowing what
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not
impact, if any, the documents m that file may
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it
have had. Truth be told, judges may also be ;
deems just under the circumstances
influenced by improper evidence, and at least m | 5. Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in
a death case where findings are not required, the pertinent part
state ought not submit, and the judge ought not
(a) Definition of unavailability "Unavailability
as a witness" includes situations in which the
admit, a whole raft of evidence, all or part of
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declarant:
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the
subject matter of the declarant's statement despite
an order of the court to do so;
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if
the . . . refusal . . . is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's
statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a
witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
compliance with the law in the course of the same
or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered . . . had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
Utah R. Evid. 804.
6. in concluding that the trial court did not commit
plain error in admitting victim impact evidence, we do
not decide whether victim impact evidence is
admissible under the Utah Constitution. See State v.
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 39 n.38 (March 2,
1994). Furthermore, in light of the fact that we
recently held for the first time that section 76-3-207 of
the Code prohibits the introduction of victim impact
evidence, id. at 32-33, we cannot conclude that the
trial court committed plain error when it admitted the
evidence at issue here in a trial held before our recent
pronouncement. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 120809 (Utah 1993).
7. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart takes aim
at the majority's failure to address each of defendant's
forty-four claims of error. We note that the sheer
number of errors alleged is no measure of the merits
of those claims. The majority has dealt with those
claims of error that are deserving of attention.
Justice Stewart also asserts that the trial court's
instruction on the State's burden of proof was
undeniably in error, citing State v. Johnson, 774 p.2d
1141,1147-48 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result, joined by Zimmerman and Durham, J J.),
and State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah
1989). In his Johnson opinion, decided after this case
was tried, when faced with an instruction in all
pertinent respects identical to the instruction at issue
here, Justice Stewart concluded that although the
instruction was incorrect, it did "not rise to the level
of reversible error." 774 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the result, joined by Zimmerman &
Durham, JJ.).
More importantly, however, we note that the
instant instruction was proper under legal principles in
place at the time it was given. Two months before
Meazies went to trial, this court approved a
reasonable doubt instruction substantively identical to
the one at issue here in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546, 572-73 (Utah 1987). It was not until one year
after Menzies' trial that we expressed in Jchnson and
Ireland our disapproval of the "weighty affairs" and
"possible or imaginary" language. Despite Justice
Stewart's suggestion to the contrary, this change in the
law is not entitled to retroactive application under our
holding in State v. Norton, 675 P. 2d 577 (Utah 1983),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734

P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986). In Norton, we recognized
that "when this Court established a new rule of law on
an essential element of a crime, a criminal defendant
whose direct appeal was pending was entitled to the
benefit of the new rule for the resolution of his
appeal." Id. at 583. We went on to emphasize,
however, that the
automatic rule of retroactivity as to nonfinaJ
judgments only applies to significant changes of
rules that are not expressly declared to be
prospective in operation. This qualification is
necessary to prevent automatic retroactivity from
displacing the traditional rule that a new rule of
criminal procedure which constitutes "a clear
break from the past" will sometimes be
nonretroactive.
Id. at 584 (emphasis added) (citing United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982)). In Ireland, we
did indicate that the change in the beyond-areasonable-doubt-instruction law was not to be
retroactive. Specifically, the Ireland court's
declaration that trial courts are to discontinue use of
the "weighty affairs' and "possible or imaginary"
language was made in the exercise of this court's
supervisory power over lower courts. 773 P.2d at
1380. This is a clear indication that we would strike
down only future verdicts based on the offending
language. We reemphasized our intention to do so in
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result, joined by Zimmerman & Durham, JJ.).
Because the invocation of our supervisory powers in
Ireland demonstrates a commitment on the part of this
court to prospectively prohibit the use of the offending
language, the Ireland/Johnson rule is not entitled to
retroactive application under our holding in Norton,
675 P.2d at 584.
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APPENDIX B

CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused-]
In all criminal prosecutions* the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT V m
[Bail — Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessivefi"i»fimposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 18- Selection of jury,
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen*
dants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed, by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of
performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship becween the prospective juror and any party, witness or person
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a
political i subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a
jfiHirnaf prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge,
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude
tile juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction
regardless of the facts:
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or
interested in carrying on any business, railing or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a
like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
tile cause, or to either party, which will prevent himfromacting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chai.lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.

APPENDIX C

1

KNOW WHICH, BUT I WOULDN'T HAVE RECOGNIZEDrHIs\ NAME AS A

2

WITNESS, AND I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU HIS NAME.

3

THIS WOULD BE QUITE [PERMANENT.

4

THE C0UR5-! ¥£S.

5

A JUROR:

6

tjR. JONES:. HE IS NOT A WITNESS.

7

WEST VI

I THOUGHT

JOHN SPENCER.
WE HAD A

,EY OFFICER^

8

JUROR:
MY HUSBAND IS RETIRED.

K
HE HAS A SMALL

WHILE I AM HERE, I ALSO WANT TO SAY
HE IS SEMI-RETIRED.

BUSINESS WHERE HE SELLS METAL DETECTORS. [TAUNI, NOTHING
FURTHER ON THE NOTES ON THIS JUROR.

JUST A BUNCH OF

ASTERISKS??????]
(A JUROR^LEA3ZES-TIIE JURY ROOMr

14 ""

-

.

^ftr^UROR ENTERS THE JURY ROOM.)

15

THE COURT:

ROSENKRANTZ.

16

A JUROR:

17

THE COURT:

18

KATHY ROSENKRANTZ, WE APPRECIATE YOUR

KATHY.
KATHY.

HOW DID WE GET KAY?

19

ENDURANCE IN SITTING THROUGH THE GENERAL VOIR DIRE AND THEN

20

WAITING ALL THIS TIME TO BE INDIVIDUALLY QUESTIONED, AND

21

THE REASON THAT WE ARE NOW AT THE STAGE OF INDIVIDUAL

22

QUESTIONING IS BECAUSE WE ARE GOING TO ASK YOU QUESTIONS

23

DEALING WITH THE DEATH PENALTY, AND WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO

24

ANSWER FRANKLY AND HONESTLY, AND WE DIDN'T WANT WHAT YOU

25

SAID TO INFLUENCE ANYBODY ELSE AND VICE VERSA.
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1

ANY GENERAL QUESTIONS?

2

NOW, I AM GOING TO READ TO YOU, AND IN FRONT

3

OF YOU IS A SHEET OF PAPER.

4

READ.

5

YOU CAN FOLLOW ALONG AS I

THE FIRST PART WILL EXPLAIN WHAT FIRST DEGREE

6

MURDER IS.

7

TWO PHASES, THE GUILT PHASE AND THE PENALTY PHASE.

8

GUILT PHASE IF YOU FIND A PERSON NOT GUILTY, THEN THAT IS

9

ALL.

10

THE SECOND PART WILL EXPLAIN IT IS DIVIDED INTO
IN THE

IF YOU FIND HIM GUILTY, THEN IT MOVE ON TO THE SECOND

PHASE WHICH IS THE PENALTY PHASE.

11

AND IN THE PENALTY PHASE, THERE ARE A NUMBER

12

OF THINGS YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER.

13

CIRCUMSTANCES AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THEN WE

14

WILL GO ON TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN TO

15

PROVE GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AS WELL AS PROVING

16

AGGRAVATING FACTORS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THAT

17

BURDEN IS ON THE STATE.

18

ONE IS THE AGGRAVATING

THAT BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS.

FOLLOWING THAT IS A SERIES OF QUESTIONS I

19

WILL ASK YOU.

20

QUESTIONS, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU ANSWER THOSE

21

QUESTIONS AS HONESTLY AND TRUTHFULLY AS YOU CAN.

22

YOU CAN FOLLOW ALONG MY READING THE

MR. MENZIES IS CHARGED WITH FIRST DEGREE

23

MURDER.

SPECIFICALLY, HE IS CHARGED WITH INTENTIONALLY,

24

KNOWINGLY CAUSING THE DEATH OF MISS HUNSAKER WHILE

25

COMMITTING, ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT, OR FLEEING FROM THE
861

1 I COMMISSION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, ROBBERY, AGGRAVATED
2 | KIDNAPPING, OR KIDNAPPING.
3 I

SHOULD THE JURY FIND MR. MENZIES NOT GUILTY

4 I OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER OR GUILTY OF SOME LESSER DEGREE OF
5 I OFFENSE, THE TRIAL WILL BE CONCLUDED AND IMPOSITION OF ANY
6

SENTENCE, IF REQUIRED BY LAW, WOULD BE LEFT TO THE COURT.

7

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE JURY WERE TO FIND

8

MR. MENZIES GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, THE TRIAL WOULD

9

EXTENT INTO A SECOND PHASE, A PENALTY PHASE, WHERE THE JURY

10

WOULD BE REQUIRED TO RETURN A VERDICT OF LIFE IN PRISON OR

11

DEATH.

12

EVIDENCE DURING THE PENALTY PHASE COULD BE

13

EXPECTED TO INCLUDE AGGRAVATING FACTORS PRESENTED IN FAVOR

14

OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND MITIGATING FACTORS PRESENTED IN A

15

FAVOR OF LIFE SENTENCE.

16

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED

17

DURING THE PENALTY PHASE, THE COURT WILL INSTRUCT THE JURY

18

THAT THE DEATH PENALTY CAN BE IMPOSED ONLY AFTER A

19

UNANIMOUS FINDING THAT THE STATE HAS PROVED BEYOND A

20

REASONABLE DOUBT FIRST, THAT THE AGGRAVATING

21

OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SECOND, THAT

22

DEATH IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY.

23

CIRCUMSTANCES

THE JURY MUST THEN BY THIS INSTRUCTION TO THE

24

EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE PENALTY PHASE AND RETURN A

25

VERDICT.

THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN AT THE PENALTY PHASE
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1

JUST AS IT DID AT THE GUILT PHASE AT THE TRIAL.

2

BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS TO THE DEFENDANT.

3
4
5
6

QUESTION ONE, HOW TO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE DEATH
PENALTY?
A JUROR:

I'VE NEVER REALLY FORMED A FIRM

OPINION ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, TO BE TRUTHFUL WITH YOU.

7

THE COURT:

8

A JUROR:

9

THIS

ANY REASON WHY

I DON'T KNOW.

THOUGHT ABOUT IT THAT MUCH OR EVER.

—

I JUST HAVEN'T
I CAN SAY THAT I GUESS

10

IF I HAD TO SWAY MORE HEAVILY ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, I WOULD

11

PROBABLY SWAY MORE HEAVILY TO THE DEATH PENALTY.

12
13
14
15
16
17

THE COURT:

HAVE YCU EVER SHARED WITH ANYONE

ELSE YOUR FEELINGS ON THE DEATH PENALTY?
A JUROR:

NOT THAT I SPECIFICALLY RECALL,

UNLESS IT WAS MY HUSBAND FOR SOME REASON OR ANOTHER.
THE COURT:

HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE DEATH

PENALTY EVER CHANGED?

18

A JUROR:

19

THE COURT:

NO.
ARE YOU PRESENTLY IRREVOCABLY

20

COMMITTED TO WHAT PENALTY A PERSON CONVICTED OF FIRST

21

DEGREE MURDER SHOULD RECEIVE?

22

A JUROR:

23

THE COURT:

NO.
SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A PENALTY

24

PHASE, WOULD YOU FOLLOW THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS AND VOTE

25

FOR THE DEATH PENALTY ONLY IF THE STATE HAS PROVED BEYOND A
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1 I REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES

2 I OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT THE DEATH
3

PENALTY IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY?

4

A JUROR:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

YES.

CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER SHOULD BE PUT TO DEATH?
A JUROR:

I GUESS I WOULD, IF THEY HAVE BEEN

8

CONVICTED OF THAT CRIME.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

DO YOU BELIEVE ALL PERSONS

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DO YOU

FEEL PUTTING SOMEONE TO DEATH IS WARRANTED?
A JUROR:

WELL, IF THEY HAVE BEEN FOUND

12

GUILTY BEYOND, I GUESS WHAT THE COURT FEELS, A SHADOW OR A

13

DOUBT, THEN I GUESS THAT IS A JUST PENALTY.

14

BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF MURDER.

15
16

THE COURT:

IF THEY HAVE

NOW, DO YOU UNDERSTAND THERE ARE

TWO PHASES TO IT, THE GUILT PHASE AND THE PENALTY PHASE?

17

A JUROR:

YES.

18

THE COURT:

ON THE PENALTY PHASE, THERE ARE

19

TWO PHASES, THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE

20

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

21

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES,

22

AND THEN IF THE STATE PROVES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE

23

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THEN YOU MAY IMPOSE OR BRING

24

BACK A VERDICT OF THE DEATH PENALTY, IF YOU FIND THAT THAT

25

IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE SENTENCE; DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

AND YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER THE
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1

A JUROR:

2

THE COURT:

YES.
IF THE STATE DOESN'T PROVE BEYOND

3

A REASONABLE DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THEN THE

4

OTHER VERDICT THAT MAY BE BROUGHT BACK IS THE LIFE

5

SENTENCE; DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

6

A JUROR:

7

THE COURT:

8

A JUROR:

10

CAN

YES, I COULD.

THE COURT:

IF I INSTRUCT YOU, WILL YOU DO

THAT?

12

A JUROR:

13

THE COURT:

14

BROKEN UP INTO TWO PARTS.

YOU CONSIDER THOSE THINGS?

9

11

UH-HUH.

YES, I WOULD.
I HAD SOME CONFUSION WITH NUMBEI

7 AND 8
A JUROR:

16 |

YES, I WOULD CONSIDER THAT.

THE COURT:

I FOUND THERE IS SOME CONFUSION

17 I WHEN FIRST DEGREE MURDER IS CONCERNED BECAUSE OF THE
18

RESPONSE THAT YOU GAVE.

19

DO YOU BELIEVE THE DEATH PENALTY IS

20

ORDINARILY PROPER PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE

21

MURDER?

22

A JUROR:

23

THE COURT:

24

YES.
IF THE JURY SHOULD CONVICT MR.

MENZIES OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WOULD YOU BE ABLE TO

25 I CONSIDER VOTING FOR A SENTENCE LESS THAN DEATH?
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1 I

A JUROR:

2 I

THE COURT:

3

YES, I COULD CONSIDER IT.
IS LIFE IN PRISON A SEVERE

PENALTY IN YOUR OPINION?

4

A JUROR:

5

THE COURT:

6

YES, I THINK IT'S SEVERE.
WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND A LIFE

TERM IN PRISON TO MEAN?

7

A JUROR:

8

THE COURT:

9

NEVER AGAIN TO LEAVE THE PRISON.
WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH

PENALTY IN ORDER TO ENSURE NO RELEASE FROM PRISON EVER

10

OCCURRED?

11

A JUROR:

YES.

12

THE COURT:

HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT OUR CURRENT

13

SYSTEM OF RELEASING CONVICTED PERSONS FROM PRISON ON PAROLE

14

AFTER APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF PARDONS?

15

A JUROR:

16

THAT IS SOMETHING ELSE I HAVEN'T

REALLY GIVEN MUCH THOUGH TO, I GUESS.

17 I ABOUT CONVICTED —

HERE AGAIN, TALKING

PERSONS CONVICTED OF MURDER.

18 I THINK THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED.

I DON'T

I GUESS I AM NOT IN

19

AGREEMENT WITH —

20

THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM PRISON IF THEY HAVE BEEN

21

CONVICTED OF MURDER.

22

DO I MAKE MYSELF CLEAR?

THE COURT:

I DON'T THINK

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A LIFE

23

SENTENCE SHOULD ACCOMPLISH THE GOAL OF REPEATED CRIMINAL

24

ACTIVITY THE SAME WAY AS THE DEATH PENALTY?

25 I

A JUROR:

IT COULD BE AS LONG AS THEY WERE
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1

NEVER RELEASED.
THE COURT:

2
3

THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE TEACHINGS OF YOUR RELIGION?
A JUROR:

4
5

DO YOU SEE ANY CONFLICTS BETWEEN

I THINK THERE COULD BE A CONFLICT

THERE.

6

THE COURT:

7

A JUROR:

COULD YOU EXPLAIN THE CONFLICT?

WELL, OF COURSE, NOW THAT I THINK

8

ABOUT IT, I THINK THE CONFLICT WOULD COME IN THE TERMS OF

9

SHEDDING THE BLOOD OF AN INNOCENT MAN,SO I HONESTLY DON'T

10

KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE VIEW POINTS OF MY RELIGION ARE ON

11

THAT —

12

ON THIS SUBJECT.
THE COURT:

NOW, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU ARE IN

13

A POSITION AT THIS STAGE TO SIT IN ON A JURY THAT MAY

14

IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY AND FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH WHAT YOU

15

FEEL YOUR RELIGION TEACHES IN REGARDS TO THAT?

16

A JUROR:

YES, I THINK I COULD.

17

THE COURT:

WHAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD THERE

18

BE, IF ANY, BETWEEN WHAT THE VICTIM SUFFERED AND WHAT THE

19

PERSON THAT CAUSED THAT SHOULD SUFFER?

20

A JUROR:

WELL

21

THE COURT:

—

DO YOU FEEL THERE IS ANY

22

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VICTIM AND THE PERSON WHO MAY HAVE

23

CAUSED THE VICTIM TO SUFFER AND HOW EACH OF THEM SHOULD

24

RESPECTIVELY SUFFER, ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO?

25

A JUROR:

I DON'T THINK SO.
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1

THE COURT:

ARE YOU WILLING TO CONSIDER

2

EVIDENCE WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT AND A LIFE

3

SENTENCE SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A PENALTY PHASE?

4

A JUROR:

YES.

5

THE COURT:

IF A PERSON WERE TO BE CONVICTED

6

OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WHAT INFORMATION WOULD YOU THEN

7

LIKE TO KNOW BEFORE MAKING A DECISION AS TO A PENALTY?

8
9
10
11

THIS IS WHERE WE HAVE GONE PASSED THE GUILT
PHASE, PENALTY PHASE, AND WE ARE CONSIDERING MITIGATING AND
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
A JUROR:

I THINK I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT

12

REALLY DROVE THIS PERSON TO THIS SEVERE CRIME, WHAT LED UP

13

TO IT, ANY DETAILS LIKE THAT.

14

THE COURT:

DO YOU BELIEVE A PERSON CAN

15

CHANGE AND BECOME BETTER OVER TIME?

16

A JUROR:

17

THE COURT:

18
19

YES.
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE

PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION?
A JUROR:

I DON'T KNOW THAT MUCH ABOUT IT,

20

BUT I FEEL THAT PSYCHIATRISTS ARE NECESSARY AND HELPFUL FOR

21

ALL I KNOW ABOUT IT.

22

THE COURT:

23

HELP PEOPLE TO CHANGE?

24

A JUROR:

25

THE COURT:

CAN SOCIAL WORKERS, PSYCHOLOGISTS

I THINK SO.
DOES THE FACT THAT QUESTIONS
868

1

CONCERNING THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE BEEN ASKED RAISE DOUBTS

2

IN YOUR MIND AS TO THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT OF MR. MENZIES?

3

A JUROR:

4

THE COURT:

5

THUS FAR, NO.
DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS THAT YC

MIGHT BE CRITICIZED FOR NOT IMPOSING A DEATH PENALTY?

6

A JUROR:

NO.

7

THE COURT:

WHAT WOULD BE YOUR FEELINGS ABOI]

8

SERVING ON A JURY WHOSE FUNCTION IS TO TRY A FIRST DEGREE

9

MURDER CASE WHERE IF THE PERSON IS CONVICTED, YOU WILL HAV

10

TO CONSIDER IMPOSITION OF A DEATH SENTENCE?

11

A JUROR:

I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE REAL

12

EASY, COME REAL EASY, BUT, YOU KNOW, THIS IS THE LAW.

13

IS SERVING JUSTICE.

14

ABOUT WHATEVER DECISION HAD TO BE MADE.

15

MR. JONES:

NO QUESTIONS.

16

MS. WELLS:

MISS ROSENKRANTZ, MAY I CALL YOU

I WOULD —

I THINK I COULD FEEL GOOD

17

ATTENTION TO QUESTION NUMBER 13.

18

WOULD READ THAT OVER REAL QUICKLY.

19

THI

AND JUST ASK YOU IF YOU

AND YOUR ORIGINAL ANSWER TO THAT WAS THAT YO

20

WOULD.

AND I GUESS I WOULD LIKE TO NARROW THE FOCUS OF

21

THAT QUESTION WITH YOU A LITTLE BIT AND SEE IF DURING A

22

PENALTY PHASE, ASSUMING THAT WE WERE THERE, AND YOU WERE

23

GIVEN INFORMATION THAT OTHERWISE WOULD NOT LEAD YOU TO VOT

24

FOR THE DEATH PENALTY, BUT YOU WERE CONCERNED THAT

25

SOMEWHERE DOWN THE ROAD, THE BOARD OF PARDONS MAY RELEASE
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1

THIS PERSON.

2

WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY JUST TO

3

ENSURE THAT THE PERSON WAS NOT EVER RELEASED FROM PRISON?

4

A JUROR:

5

MAY NOT.

6

NOW.

7

WELL, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, I

I GUESS IT'S HARD FOR ME TO SAY DEFINITELY RIGHT

MS. WELLS:

DO YOU STILL CONSIDER THAT THAT

8

WOULD BE A FACTOR THAT YOU WOULD LOOK AT IN DECIDING

9

BETWEEN DEATH AND LIFE?

10

A JUROR:

11

MS. WELLS:

12

YES.
THAT IS KNOWING THE RAMIFICATIONS

THAT DEATH WOULD MEAN DEATH, BUT LIFE MIGHT NOT MEAN LIFE?

13

A JUROR:

14

MS. WELLS:

THAT IS ALL.

15

THE COURT:

ON THE QUESTION OF NO RELEASE

16

YES.

FROM PRISON EVER OCCURRED, WE DISCUSSED THE TWO PHASES, THE

17 I GUILT PHASE AND THE PENALTY PHASE.

THE PENALTY PHASE IS

18 I AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
19

AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN TO GO PROVE

20

A REASONABLE DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING

21

A JUROR:

22

THE COURT:

CIRCUMSTANCES?

YES.
AND IF THEY DO THAT, THEN YOU MAY

23

BRING BACK A VERDICT THAT IS APPROPRIATE, THE PENALTY OF

24

DEATH.

25 I

A JUROR:

YES.
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MS. WELLS:

1

YOUR HONOR, COULD THE COURT

2

CLARIFY, AGAIN, THE TWO-PRONGED TEST, THAT IT BE BEYOND A

3

REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT IT BE THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY.

4

THE COURT:

5

A JUROR:

6

THE COURT:

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

YES.
THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY.

7

AND THEN IF THE STATE FAILS TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE

8

DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND IF YOU FIND THAT

9

THAT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE —

OR YOU DO NOT FIND THAT

10

THAT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY, THEN YOU GO TO THE

11

MITIGATING SIDE.

12

A JUROR:

13

THE COURT:

14

UH-HUH.
THE MITIGATING SIDE IS THE LIFE

SENTENCE.

15

A JUROR:

YES.

16

THE COURT:

AND THAT IS WHAT THE LAW SAYS,

17

DIVIDED INTO THOSE TWO.

AND IF THE STATE FAILS TO PROVE

18

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES,

19

COULD YOU IMPOSE THE LIFE SENTENCE?

20

A JUROR:

21

THE COURT:

22

YES.
COULD YOU JUST STEP OUT ONE

MOMENT,, AND WE WILL CALL YOU RIGHT BACK IN.

23

(A JUROR LEAVES THE JURY ROOM 0

24

MS. WELLS:

25

WE WOULD ENTER A CHALLENGE FOR

CAUSE, AND THE REASON FOR THAT IS THE JUROR INDICATED THAT
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1

SHE WOULD CONSIDER VOTING FOR THE DEATH PENALTY IN, ORDER TO

2

ENSURE NO RELEASE FROM PRISON EVER OCCURRED.
UNDER THE STATUTE, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THAT

3
4

WOULD FALL INTO THE NATURE OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES,

5

THAT ONE COULD CONSIDER EXACTLY HOW TO FORMULATE THAT, BUT

6

I THINK THAT STATE'S/THE BASIS FOR THE ARGUMENT.

7

MR. JONES:

WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE PROBLEM

8

WITH THAT, AGAIN, WE ARE PUTTING ONE QUESTION OUT OF

9

CONTEXT.

10

IF YOU RECALL HER ANSWER TO QUESTION NUMBER 6,

SHE SAID SHE WOULD FOLLOW THE STANDARD.
SHE WOULD REQUIRE US TO PROVE THE AGGRAVATING

11
12

CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING BEYOND A REASONABLE

13

DOUBT, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE

14

PENALTY QUESTIONS, SHE SAID SHE WOULD CONSIDER A SENTENCE

15

LESS THAN DEATH.

16

WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE LIFE

17

SENTENCE.

18

SHE SAID SHE WOULD CONSIDER EVIDENCE

CERTAINLY, THERE ARE A LOT OF FACTORS THAT A

19 I JURY CAN CONSIDER IN TRYING TO DECIDE WHETHER TO IMPOSE A
20

DEATH SENTENCE OR LIFE IN PRISON.

21

THE FACTORS SHE LOOKED AT, SHE STILL IS WILLING TO FOLLOW

22

THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LAW AS IT APPLIES TO IMPOSING A

23

DEATH SENTENCE.

24

THE COURT:

WHILE THAT MAY BE ONE OF

BASED ON HER RESPONSES TO THE

25 I VARIOUS QUESTIONS, THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT SHE
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1

WOULD CONSIDER ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND TRY THE CASE PROVEI

2

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND

3

ONLY IF APPROPRIATE THAT SHE WOULD IMPOSE —

4

VERDICT OF DEATH.

5

CIRCUMSTANCES AND BRING BACK A VERDICT OF LIFE IN PRISON.

6

SO DENY THE MOTION FOR CAUSE.

7

IF YOU CAN BRING HER BACK IN.

8

(A JUROR ENTERS THE JURY ROOM.)

9

THE COURT:

BRING BACK A

OTHERWISE, SHE WOULD CONSIDER MITIGATI*

IF WE CAN JUST HAVE YOU WAIT

10

OUTSIDE OF THE JURY ROOM, WE HAVE JUST A FEW OTHER

11

QUESTIONS WITH YOU.

12

BY 5:00.

OTHERWISE, HOPEFULLY, WE WILL FINISH

13

(A JUROR LEAVES THE JURY ROOM.)

14

(A JUROR ENTERS THE JURY ROOM.)

15

THE COURT:

16

A JUROR:

17

THE COURT:

LINDA SANDSTROM.

THAT'S RIGHT.
WE APPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE IN

18

WAITING THROUGH THE GENERAL VOIR DIRE, AND NOW, WE ARE INT

19

THE INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE.

20

THE REASON WE HAVE THIS IS WE WANT TO ASK YO

21

QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DEATH PENALTY, SO WE DIDN'T WANT

22

ANYTHING THAT YOU MAY RESPOND TO TO AFFECT THE OTHER JUROR

23

AND VICE VERSA.

24

A JUROR:

25

THE COURT:

I SEE.
BEFORE WE START ON THAT, YOU
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APPENDIX D

1

HERE BEFORE THAT TIME SO THAT WE CAN RESUME ON TIME, WE

2

WILL START WITH THE OPENING STATEMENTS, AND THEN W£ WILL

3

PROCEED AS I INDICATED WHEN I WAS EXPLAINING TO YOU THE

4

PROCEDURES THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW.

• : rz

5
S

i

I S THERE ANY OTHER MATTERS THAT WE SHOULD
HANDLE AT THIS TIME!

,.

7

MR. JONES-;

NO, YOUR HONOR.

3

THE COURT:

I F NOT, I JUST WANT TO ADMONISH

9

YOU, AGAIN, THAT YOU ARE NOT TO TALK WITH ANY ONE REGARDING

[)

THIS CASE, FAMILY MEMBERS, RELATIVES OR NEIGHBORS OR ANYONE

L

ELSE.

2

I F ANYONE SHOULD APPROACH YOU, TELL THEM THAT

3

YOU ARE ON JURY DUTY AND YOU CANNOT TALK ABOUT THIS CASE.

I

I F THEY SHOULD PERSIST, WALK AWAY AND REPORT THAT TO THE

3

COURT, AND PLEASE DO NOT EXPOSE YOURSELF TO ANY PUBLICITY
FROM TELEVISION, RADIO, NEWSPAPERS OR ANYTHING ELSE.

IS

THAT UNDERSTOOD?
I F THERE I S NONE — I F THERE I S ANYONE THAT
v C ~* ~t

"• *

DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND.
THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW NO ONE HAS RAISED
THEIR HAND.

SO YOU MAY BE EXCUSED FOR THIS EVENING.
(JURY I S EXCUSED.)

YV. ;MS-r-WBLLS:

h
YOUR HONOR, WE NEED FOR THE

BENEFIT OF THE RECORD THE JURY — YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD JUST
LIKE THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE NOT WAIVING OUR
891

1

CAUSE CHALLENGES THAT WE PREVIOUSLY MADE TO JURORS UPON

2

WHICH WE DID NOT EXERCISE OUR PRE-EMPTORY CHALLENGES.

3

THINK SPECIFICALLY ALTERNATE NUMBER 1 ,

4

EXERCISE A PRE-EMPTORY ON THAT.

5

CAUSE.

I

THAT WE DID NOT

WE DID CHALLENGE FOR

WE ARE NOT WAIVING THAT ON AN APPEAL I S S U E .

6

BUT THE REASON THAT WE DID NOT DO THAT IS

7

GIVEN THE ENTIRE POOL THAT WE HAD BEFORE US, IT WAS OUR

8

DECISION THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE OTHERS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE

9

OFF GIVEN THEIR ORDER AND THE ENTIRE SITUATION.

10

WE WOULD ALSO LIKE THE COURT TO NOTE FOR THE

11

RECORD THAT THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT OUR FOUR CAUSE

12

MOTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE JURORS HAS CAUSED US TO

13

EXERCISE ON THOSE SAME JURORS.

14

OF THEM THAT WE BELIEVE WE EXERCISED PRE-EMPTORIES ON THAT

15

WE ORDINARILY WOULD NOT HAVE I F THE COURT HAD GRANTED OUR

16

MOTIONS AND, IN FACT, THE DEFENSE ENDS UP HAVING FOUR PRE-

17

EMPTORY CHALLENGES THAT WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE IN A

18

CAPITAL CASE.

19

I BELIEVE TSERE ARE EIGHT

AND SO. WE BELIEVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF

20

DOING THAT HAS CREATED AN UNFAIR — HAS CREATED PROBLEMS

21

WITH US EXERCISING TO-HAVE A'FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY

22

BECAUSE WE ARE LIMITED TO FOUR PRE-EMPTORIES.

23

1

XilM

WWW*\A

•

4» A A M

m* X £ ^ X M

•

24

MR. JONES:

NO RESPONSE.

25

THE COURT:

OKAY.

IT WILL BE NOTED FOR THE
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APPENDIX E

IF SHE COULD FE FAIR A»:D IMPARTIAL PECAUST SHE WAS WORRYING
APOUT THAT.

IF THE COURT W&NTS TO EXPLORE THAT UITH HEP, THAT

IG FINE, PUT I WOULD MAKE- A MOT 10!: TO EXCUSE HFR.

.

MP. JONES:

WHY DON'T WE WAIT AND SEE.

MS. WELLS:

SIXTY-EICHT IS THE WOMA?.' WMC

INDICATED AS f QUESTION AROSE REGARDINC PHOTOGRAPHS, SHE DIDf'T
KHOW IF SHE WOULD BE APLE TO TAKE THAT OR SOMETHING LIKE T H M T "
THJTHAT

EFFECT.

MOW, BASED UPON THAT ALO?JE, IT SFEMS THAT IT

WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO REMOVE HER FOR CAUSE.
MR. JONES:

WHY D O f T YOU TAKr THAT UNDER

THE COURT:

T?KE UHGRICHT, HEIDI MILLER, SU£M!

ADVISEMENT.

MEALD, KAY TURNER UNDER ADVISEMENT.
MS. WELLS:

YOUR HONOR, WE WERFN'T OH THF

RECO»D EARLIER WHEW WE HAD SOME SIMILAR CONCERNS PBOUT PFOPLF,
AMD HOW IT MIGHT DEVELOP, ANr I PRORABLY SHOULD MAKE A RECORD
ON THAT RIGHT NOW AS TO WHICH OTHER OMES THE DEFENSE WOULD MOVE
TO CHALLENGE FOP CAUSE THAT HAVE KOT BEEN TAKFK OFF.
. .

I BELIEVE WE MOVED OR WOULD MOVE AT TKIS TIMF

BASED UPON^PREVIOUS ANSWERS KUMFEB 74, WHICH IS MISS WAGSTAFF.
SHE IS THE OME WHO OWNS THE CONVENIENCE STORE WITH HER HUSPAKC
WHICH HAS SEEN THE VICTIM OT RECENT ROBBERIES OR AGGRAVATED
R03EERIES.
WE ALSO PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AND WOULD
FORMALLY MOVE TO EXCUSE MISS STROUD, MUMPER 21, FOR CAUSE.

SHE
2f9

IS THE Oil'*, THAT HAP P LONC ASSOCIATION WITH OR CLOSE
ASSOCIATION WITH A NUNFER OF POLICE OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY
MEMBERS OF THE SALT L*KE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEFAPTMENT.
MR. BARBER, NUMPER PI, IS THE ONE WHO, I
GUESS, LIVED NEXT DOOR TO ^ SALT LAKE COUN'TY SHERIFF'S DEPUTY,
AND TH?T DEPUTY IS RELATED TO ONE OF THE WITNESSES IN THIS
CASE, TO DETECTIVE JUDD.

HE IS ALSO RELATED TO ANOTHER PERSON

ON THE COUNTY NARCOTICS FORCE, SO WE WOULD HOVE TO EXCUSE

NUMBER 81.
I THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE TO DO THESE NOW.

1.1
1

MAY PE THAT WE DON'T GET TO THESE PERSONS, BUT ON THE OTHER

1

HAND WE MICHT, AND SO I THINK IT'S PROPER TO BRING THOSE.

IT

WE DISCUSSED J^OELEMS SURROUNDING fJ\ts~'MILLER
1-1

/yME. RINOUEST, MR. WILDE, PUT THOSE HAVE — WE WON'T FORMALLY
MOVE TO EXCUSE THEM AT THIS TIME.

13

It

T H E O T H E R O N E S , I T H I N K , J U S T S U B J E C T TO S O M E

r

I N D I V I D U A L C U E S T I O N S , P A R T I C U L A R L Y M I S S E R I C K S O N R E G A R D I N G HER

li

M E D I C A L C O N D I T I O N A N D HFR R E L I G I O U S V I E W S .

i<\

THE COURT:

IS T H A T IT?

?t

THE CLERK:

THEY A R E A L L U N D E R

2}
23
2

\

24

ADVISFMENT.

/

MS. WELLS: ONE OF THEM WE TOOK OFF THAT
/
0^
WAS j / DIDN'T WE DECIDE TO, SORENSEN?
THE COURT: ARE WE READY?
MS. WELLS:

JUDGE, BEFORE WE BEGIN THIS, COUL1

> PERHAPS VERY ERIEFLY WE DISCUSS THE FORMAT THAT THIS IS GOING
27P!

APPENDIX F

INSTRUCTION NO.

l^

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
vor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
proved

guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of a

asonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the
ate to prove

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,

w by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason
d one which is reasonable in view of all the evidence.

Proof

yond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies
e mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to
t conscientiously upon it.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which

asonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from
e evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case.
If after an impartial consideration and comparison of all
e evidence in the case you can candidly say that you are not
tisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt,
t if after such impartial consideration and comparison of all
5 evidence

you can truthfully

say that you have an abiding

aviction of the defendant's guilt such as you will be willing to
t upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to
IT

own affairs, you have no reasonable

doubt.

A reasonable

ibt must be a real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely
ssible or imaginary.

